

MIDWEST JOURNAL OF *Political Science*

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MIDWEST JOURNAL

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*The Commodity Credit Corporation and the 1948 Presidential Election**

JUDGMENTS regarding the responsibility of politicians in democratic societies usually contain two concepts which may be inconsistent. One concept involves the responsiveness of the politician to the dominant preferences of the community; the other, his responsibility for the consequences of policy resulting from his decisions.¹ According to the second concept, the politician cannot absolve himself from failures by saying, "I merely followed public desire and public desire was wrong." The conflict inherent in these two assumptions underlies many classic debates on the nature of democracy. The theories of representation of Burke and Mill provide one such example. This paper, however, does not propose

* The author wishes to express his thanks for the critical comments and helpful counsel of Joseph C. Palamountain, Richard Kirkendall and, especially, Charles M. Hardin.

¹ Cf. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds. and trans., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 115-128.

to approach the paradox in a frontal fashion; rather, it seeks to show how institutional arrangements, by reinforcing the exigencies of politics, are important in providing conditions under which the second concept, responsibility for consequences, may be discouraged.

Some commentators believe that agricultural politics were crucial to Truman's victory in 1948.² Insofar as their judgment is correct, the substantive problem here investigated may have significance independent of the general problem of responsibility.

The major agriculture issue used by the Democratic party during the 1948 campaign was concerned with the power of the Commodity Credit Corporation to acquire grain storage facilities. The CCC is the agency used by the Department of Agriculture to finance its huge agricultural price support and commodity storage program.³ A revised charter for the Corporation had been written by the Eightieth Congress. The precise issue of this study involves the intent of Congress in making the charter revisions.

It has long been recognized that legislative intent is a contradictory term. How can a plural body have *an* intent? Though a fiction, it remains a necessary concept in the operation of government. Through institutionalization the fiction is made real or at least official. Consequently the institutional process which per-

² For one of the more recent articles on this issue see Charles M. Hardin, "Farm Policy and Farm Vote," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXVII (1955), 601-24. Among those emphasizing the importance of the farm vote, Professor Hardin lists political scientists Louis Bean and A. N. Holcombe, and journalists Samuel Lubell, Marquis Childs, William Blair, Luther Huston and Arthur Krock. Professor Hardin dissents from this view, as does Samuel Eldersveld, "The Influence of Metropolitan Pluralities in Presidential Elections Since 1920," *American Political Science Review*, XLIII (1949), 1189 ff., 1200. Many writers not primarily concerned with analysis of the 1948 election accept the dominant assumption that the farm vote was responsible for Truman's victory. For instance, see David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Intellectuals and the Discontented Classes," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), p. 72, and Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents and Coattails* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 33.

³ For a discussion of some of the unique administrative attributes of the Commodity Credit Corporation see Reed Frischknecht, "The Commodity Credit Corporation: A Case Study of a Government Corporation," *Western Political Quarterly*, VI (1953), 559-69.

forms this act of transubstantiation is elevated to great importance. This paper examines the institutionalized process by which the 1948 CCC charter bill received its meaning, or more specifically, the manner in which contradictory interpretations were placed upon it by Republican Congressmen and a Democratic Administration. Our purpose, however, is not simply to catalog another example of friction between the legislative and executive branches, but rather to point out certain conditions which invite a breakdown of responsibility.

As is well known, the 1948 Democratic campaign was a dramatic one. Truman's rough and tumble train platform oratory was the outstanding feature of the race. In all the farm belt speeches of September and October, Truman used the revised CCC charter as the clinching argument to prove the antipathy of the Republican Eightieth Congress to the interests of the farmers. In Truman's words, the charter's revision was a "pitchfork in the farmer's back."⁴

Briefly, the Truman argument was this: In order to participate in the price support program, farmers must have their grain in government-approved storage. In earlier years when there was a storage shortage, the Democratic Administration had erected emergency bins throughout the grain belt. The CCC charter empowered the Corporation to erect such facilities for the handling and storage of commodities. Under the charter, as revised by the Republican Eightieth Congress, the Corporation was prohibited from acquiring emergency steel bins. Consequently, farmers unable to locate storage could not turn to the government, and without storage space could not get price support loans. Finally, Truman added that the charter revision was engineered by the grain trade lobby. He asserted that grain "speculators" were plotting to buy the grain at distressed prices during the marketing glut at harvest time to resell later on a rising market.

⁴ *New York Times*, September 19, 1948, p. 3. The occasion for Truman's remark was the Sixth Annual National Plowing Contest at Dexter, Iowa, where he spoke to an assembled 100,000, mostly farmers. Truman made two swings through the farm belt in the late summer and fall. The grain storage issue was the climax of most of his speeches, according to the *New York Times* reports. See especially the issues of September 19 and October 13 and 31.

Although there were murmurs of dissent among Republicans, the Dewey forces did not challenge Truman's story. (A prominent grain trade official stated in an interview with the author that a detailed reply was worked out for Dewey. However, his camp was so confident of victory it was switching the tone of speeches to national unity and de-emphasizing inter-party discord.) The principal contemporary public reply to Truman appeared in the trade journals of the grain handling industry.⁵ With the press of new issues and duties upon the incoming Congress in December, the charter issue became lost. However, in 1952 just prior to the succeeding Presidential campaign, Senator Aiken of Vermont formulated a Republican rebuttal to Truman's assertions.

Senator Aiken asserted that indeed there had been a plot against the farmers in 1948, but the real villains were "office-hungry politicians." One of his charges was that the talk of storage shortage in 1948 was a part of a larger plot to lower prices and to develop a "depression" frame of mind in farmers. Supposedly, such "depression" thinking would favor Democrats, but, more interesting to this study, he denied that the revised CCC charter really did prohibit a government emergency bin program.⁶ Thereby he struck at the very heart of Truman's campaign message. It was clear that the Administration and Aiken were placing diametrically opposed interpretations upon the same document.

The most meticulous research and rereading of the charter obviously cannot pretend to say what the true meaning of the charter should have been. This would but ignore the source of the problem of intent. However, the usual lawyers' tools such as hearings, reports, public statements and rules of construction can be used to ferret out discrepancies of reasoning or loopholes. But Congressional intent also depends upon historical context. So it is only fitting that we look first at the two trends of the

⁵ See *Grain and Feed Journals Consolidated*, Chicago, September 22, 1948, p. 9, October 13, 1948, pp. 21-23, October 27, p. 10; *Grain and Feed Review*, Minneapolis, October, 1948, p. 4, November, 1948, p. 16; *Northwestern Miller*, Minneapolis, November 2, 1948, p. 21; *Southwestern Miller*, Kansas City, September 2, p. 39, October 5, 1948, p. 39, October 26, 1948, p. 35.

⁶ *Congressional Record*, XCDIII (June 9, 1952), 6313.

time which were largely responsible for the passage of the charter revision bill and the subsequent construction placed on it.

The first trend involves the fears by conservatives of the burgeoning federal bureaucracy in post-war years. A series of post-war laws were aimed at curbing powers and fixing procedures of agencies created for war and depression purposes. Among the laws to protect private enterprise from further government encroachment were the Administrative Procedure Acts, the Labor Management Relations Act, and the Government Corporation Control Act.⁷ The grain handling industry joined in this effort to forestall "creeping socialism." In fact it found special justification for its predisposition in continued government controls over the exportation of grain, the regulation of milling extraction rates, investigations of grain futures trading, as well as the agricultural price program which directly affected the entire industry. Consequently, it is not surprising that the grain handling industry sought from the friendly Eightieth Congress certain guarantees for its future.

In 1948 a revision of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter was made necessary by a stipulation in the Corporation Control Act.⁸ The grain trade sought sweeping changes in the new Corporation charter; its two most substantial achievements were the stipulations that the Corporation could not acquire or lease any "... plant or facility or ... acquire or lease real property ..." and that the Corporation should use the usual channels of trade in carrying out its activities. The grain trade's justification for these provisions was the fear that the government would erect a rival, publicly-owned grain-handling system for managing the increasing quantities of grain coming under the government agriculture program.

⁷ 60 Stat. 237, 61 Stat. 136, 59 Stat. 597.

⁸ Prior to 1948, the Commodity Credit Corporation, a federal corporation, was incorporated under laws of the state of Delaware. The Corporation Control Act terminated such anomalous administrative arrangements (Sec. 304(b)). The new federal charter clarified the purposes and powers of the CCC. The Delaware charter had allowed the Corporation extremely broad powers. It could even buy and sell gold. Cf. *Hearings, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry*, S. 1322, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, pp. 10, 14.

The second sequence of events which had a bearing on the charter's interpretation reached a climax in 1948. High prices during and immediately following the war had thrown the storage aspects of the price support program into disuse. In 1948 agricultural production in the war-ravaged countries was beginning to revive. Our export of relief grain was being drastically reduced.⁹ In this same year we enjoyed a bountiful harvest, especially of corn. Although it was to be the largest crop of record, its size was not realized by many until quite late in the season. Therefore, it was late in the year when the farmers began to anticipate a price decline and to understand that they would have to exercise their options for storage loans for the first time in years. The subsequent quest for storage revealed the severe national shortage of space. Shortage of materials during the war, plus a lack of demand, had led to this decrease in storage facilities. Yet the grain carryover in the fall of 1948 was over a billion bushels more than it had been in the previous year. Many farmers were growing apprehensive about storage when Truman announced to mid-western farmers that the "grain lobby" had so rigged the CCC charter that he could not come to the farmers' aid.

There is little evidence that the lower bureaucracy spread the Truman story, but USDA activities may have made farmers storage conscious and consequently increasingly sensitive to Truman's fall speeches.¹⁰ During the summer of 1948, the Department of Agriculture conducted a very active educational campaign to alert farmers to the coming need for storage bins. Its release did not stress the effects of the new CCC charter; rather they emphasized the prospect of a large corn crop, the reduction of space over the post-war period, and rapid mechanized harvesting which increased pressure on storage facilities near the point of harvest.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 136 ff.

¹⁰ This assertion is based upon the contents of the official "kit" explaining the nature of the storage problem to the lower bureaucracy and on the inter-departmental memos dealing with storage sent to the Chicago Production and Marketing Administration office during the summer months. However, a letter on August 9 to 95,000 local PMA committeemen mentioned the revised charter. As of August 28, with the speech of Undersecretary of Agriculture, Albert J. Loveland, over the radio program, "National Farm and Home Hour," the political appointees in the USDA began developing the Truman story.

The political question then became: Did the grain trade's effort for economic security lead Congress to emasculate the government storage program; and secondarily, if so, were the trade and Congress aware of the effects of their actions? Phrased concisely in terms of legislative intent, the question is: Did Section 4(h) of the CCC charter include emergency grain bins in its ban on the acquisition of "plants," "facilities," and "real property"?

The Administration's affirmative reply was primarily a legal one based upon hermeneutics and the internal logic of the charter. The grain trade had argued that Section 4(h) was aimed only at prohibiting the acquisition of real property, not personality. As the emergency steel bins were portable they should be exempt from the purview of this section.¹¹ However, Section 4(h) not only mentioned real property but also "any . . . plant or facility" used for the physical handling, storage, processing, servicing, and transporting of agricultural commodities. This would seem to have made the prohibition pretty comprehensive. But the defenders of the Republican Congressional leadership pointed out that another charter provision, Section 5(b), provided the Corporation with the power to "make available materials and facilities required in connection with the production and marketing of agriculture commodities." Here again, however, the Administration had the better legal argument. Clinton Anderson, in a closely reasoned brief, pointed out that the logic of the charter made this latter clause subordinate to the clause prohibiting property acquisition (Section 4, [h]).¹² The Administration also added the clinching point that in any case the new charter prohibited the leasing of land which was most assuredly real property, and consequently even if the government had acquired the bins, it would have had no place to put them.

The words of the charter taken in their literal sense supported the Administration's actions admirably. But conflicting purposes, the press of varied duties, lack of time for reflection by overworked

¹¹ A layman's distinction between real property and personality is that the latter is movable; in fact though, the distinction is much more complex.

¹² *Hearings*, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, S. 900, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, pp. 81-2.

lawmakers, the imperfection of language, and occasionally sheer incompetence, may lead Congress to place words in a bill which seem contrary to a general consensus of Congressional opinion at the time the bill is passed. Furthermore, unforeseen events give totally new meanings to old laws. Republican spokesmen claimed that a dispassionate view of the record with this consideration in mind would have given a different meaning to the CCC charter of 1948. One of their arguments concerned the role of the grain trade in the charter's revision.

The Administration claimed that the "speculative grain trade" had engineered the new restrictive charter provisions. While it is true that the grain trade did originate the controversial charter amendments, the record reveals a number of interesting insights into the trade's objectives. When its chief spokesman, H. E. Sanford, was questioned in the hearings, he denied that the new charter would have any effects on the emergency bin program. His words were, "I do not think that [the steel bin] is real property."¹³ On three additional occasions grain trade spokesmen made similar assertions.¹⁴ Thus the trade representatives indicated that the clause prohibiting acquisition of property by the Corporation was not intended to cover personalty. In addition to these overt statements, the grain trade representatives gave other indications that the bin program was to be exempted by this real-property distinction. In the House hearings, the grain trade representatives were asked what types of property previously acquired by the CCC would henceforth be prohibited. The surprising answer was none. Yet all present were aware of the existing CCC practice with regard to emergency bins. One Congressman who seemed eager to aid the grain trade's cause pointed to the bins as an example of unwarranted government ownership. But Mr. Sanford dismissed the bins as not germane to the grain trade's objectives.¹⁵

¹³ H. E. Sanford, Chairman of the National Grain Trade Council, at *Hearings*, S. 1322, p. 124. Other spokesmen for the trade included Roger C. Slaughter, Counsel for the Boards of Trade of Chicago and Kansas City and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, and Charles B. Crofton, representing the North American Grain Export Association.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 183; *Hearings*, House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency, HR 6263, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 134.

¹⁵ *Hearings*, HR 6263, p. 134.

If the grain trade had no objections to the bins, why did it not so stipulate in its proposal? There is no clear answer to the question, but one possible key to this confusion may be found in another statement by Mr. Sanford. In seeking to illustrate the objects which the grain trade wanted to include in the property ban, he listed farm lands, warehouses, elevators, railroads, terminal facilities, barges, boats, and wharves.¹⁸ The peculiar thing about this testimony is that a number of these items, such as barges and boats, are not real property but personalty. Thus, at least some members of the trade's lobby did not understand the legal distinction between real property and personalty. It seems quite possible that the trade's lawyers failed to develop legal categories which could answer the trade's purpose but not go beyond them. This experience would also seem to point up the difficulty of using common law categories, designed for property relations between individuals, for defining the government's role in regulating a major marketing complex.

Some additional insight into grain trade objectives may be gained from an examination of grain trade journals in the months prior to the charter legislation. Two of the more important journals, *The Grain and Feed Review* of Minneapolis and the *Grain and Feed Journals Consolidated* of Chicago give comprehensive coverage to state and regional trade association conventions. A tabulation of the convention resolutions in the seven months prior to the passage of the Charter Bill gives some indication of grass roots concern in the trade. Of thirty-eight resolutions on federal issues passed by nineteen conventions, thirteen concern futures markets, eight the International Wheat Agreement, six advocated amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, five pertained to the CCC, and six to miscellaneous other matters. Of the five resolutions on the CCC, three merely opposed a permanent charter. The bin program was not mentioned in any resolution nor in any reported speeches. It would appear that there was no widespread concerted effort within the trade aimed at the bin program at this time.

Apparently, Congressional leaders, with few exceptions, also shared the belief that the new charter did not interfere with the

¹⁸ *Hearings*, S. 1322, p. 122.

bin program. The report of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, whose bill included the grain trade amendments, stated that one of the Corporation's purposes was to supply grain bins in connection with the production, handling, and marketing of agricultural commodities.¹⁷ Specifically, it interpreted Section 5(b) to "enable the corporation to carry out such operations as procuring and aiding in the procurement of feeds, seeds, *grain bins, and other storage facilities*, bagging, fertilizer and insecticides. Operations of this character have been *carried out in the past . . .* under the Corporation's general charter authority."¹⁸ The reference to "grain bins" must have been to the emergency bins in question, for no other bin program had been "carried out in the past." Furthermore, it would seem unlikely that Congress would have intended to grant a power in one clause of the charter and withdraw it in another. Yet, as Clinton Anderson has pointed out, a literal reading of the charter produces precisely this result.

When the Charter Bill was brought up for debate on the House floor, Congressman H. Carl Anderson questioned Congressman Jesse Wolcott specifically about the new charter's effect on the bin program. Wolcott's reply emphasized the real-personalty distinction, implying that the bins would fall under the exempt personality category.¹⁹ Consequently, it appears that the House voted with key interested members believing the emergency bin program remained intact.

In 1952 Senator Aiken put forth a new claim concerning the correct meaning of the revised charter. The Senator stated that in the summer of 1948 he had stayed on in Washington following the adjournment of Congress to clarify the meaning of much agricultural legislation which had been passed in the closing rush of Congress. Among the bills which the Senator reviewed, with the aid of the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture, was Public Bill 806, the new CCC charter. Their joint conclusion was that authorization for the bin program was found in yet another section of the charter, 4(m). This was a sort of "sweeping clause" which

¹⁷ H. Rept. 1790, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13. (Emphasis supplied.)

¹⁹ *Congressional Record*, XCIV (June 18, 1948), 8872.

authorized the Corporation to engage in all activities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. This clause had the legal advantage of being among the general powers and therefore coordinate with the controversial 4(h) section. As such, it could not be nullified by the prohibitions of this latter clause.²⁰ Thus, Aiken appeared to have found an escape hatch which would free the bin program, though it was necessary to employ a rather strained construction to do so. His interpretation was like using the preamble of the Constitution to swallow the subsequent restrictions.

No doubt the pressure of the impending election did much to fashion the storage issue. A caretaker attitude may well have dominated Brannan's administration of the Department of Agriculture and little long-range planning was being pushed. The election strongly influenced the passage of that impossible legislative contradiction, the Hope-Aiken Bill,²¹ which dominated Congress' interests in the waning hours of the session. Indeed, concentration on the Hope-Aiken Bill led to the shunting aside of the Charter Bill, so that Congressmen gave it only cursory consideration.²²

Indeed the election seems to have affected the whole logic of the statements being made about storage, for there is some indication that the campaign seized on an essentially moot question and made it one of widespread concern. To demonstrate this it is necessary to review briefly certain aspects of the storage program.

When a farmer wishes to receive a price support loan on his corn or wheat crop, he shoulders the responsibility himself for finding storage which will meet government standards. He can supply his own space or rent space at a country or terminal elevator. The farmer has the option of paying back the loan and claiming the grain at any time during the year, or he can keep the loan money and let the government "foreclose" on him at the

²⁰ *Congressional Record*, XCVIII (June 9, 1952), 6813.

²¹ 62 Stat. 1247.

²² The Charter Bill was reported on the House floor on June 18, 1948, and passed without record vote under a suspension of the rules which forbade amendments. On June 19 the bill was returned to the Senate, conferences were requested in both houses, the conference committees met, reported, and the bill passed both houses all in the same day. The following day Congress adjourned.

end of the year. When the government becomes owner of the grain, it then becomes the government's responsibility to house it. This has traditionally been the source of the need of the government's emergency steel bins. When the grain trade cannot handle the government storage business, the government sets up its own bins. *These emergency bins have never been used to house grain under loan, still in the farmer's legal possession.* The government required the farmer to furnish his own storage, in 1948, just as it had in previous and subsequent years. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized.

However, it should be pointed out that the inability of the CCC to construct temporary bins would have had a very serious effect on the price support program in the following year. For in 1949, when the government took over large quantities of grain, it would have had to compete with farmers for a short supply of the storage facilities if only private space had been available. The government's emergency bins were necessary when commercial grain facilities could not accommodate the combined demand of the government and the farmers.

But in 1948 the curb on the emergency bin program could have affected the storage situation only if a new use was contemplated for the steel bins. But evidence indicates that the Department of Agriculture contemplated no such new policy in the summer of 1948. In the 1949 hearing on restoration of the Corporation's property-acquiring powers, Secretary Brannan testified that he was prepared to get a steel bin program under way as soon as the charter was amended. The case for allocation of steel had been presented to the Department of Commerce, manufacturers had been consulted as to design and pattern, and measures were being taken to get all interested parties in readiness.²³ This was February 16, 1949, yet in the previous June no plans of this sort had been laid. When questioned about the situation, Brannan defended himself by saying he had sensed the mood of Congress and had foreseen the strictures on storage facilities.²⁴ Yet it was late April before the restrictive clause appeared on the scene.

²³ *Hearings*, Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, S. 900, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 21.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

However, the discrepancy between the timetable in 1948 and 1949 does make sense if we assume that departmental policy on the use of bins had remained unchanged. Takeover time is in the spring. The government was soon going to take over grain which was under expiring loans. Indeed the bins ordered in the winter of 1949, at the time Brannan was testifying, were used to store government grain only.

Although election year tactics undoubtedly colored certain assertions, responsibility for confusion in storage policy must be shared by Congress, the Administration and the grain trade. All erred in not foreseeing a radical shift in our grain supply situation. The grain trade and the Republican Congressmen failed to see the future needs for emergency storage. It is pretty evident that the grain trade looked upon the bins as a thing of the past. For some years the CCC had been slowly selling off its stock of bins to farmers and elevators. The new CCC charter carefully protected the Corporation's continued ownership of property it then held. It overlooked the possibility of an expanding bin program.

As a result of these foregoing events, we had this strange situation in the fall of 1948. The Administration refused to initiate a program which it felt was desirable, which the Congress thought it had approved, and to which interested parties outside the government did not object. Indeed no one appeared to be opposed to the emergency bin program, and nearly everyone seemed to wish that the CCC charter made it legal. This confusing situation well illustrates the need for rethinking the question: What makes a law a law? What is the touchstone of legitimacy in statutory interpretation? What is the basis for administrative interpretation of legislative intent? The question is complex, but any viable answer must take into consideration some minimum habitual agreement in communication between the interested administrative and legislative parties. Normally, there is a certain amount of direct communication between bureaucrats and Congressmen, though such communication is always subject to interpretation. An administrator in construing a Congressional statement must anticipate reactions. He must operate in awareness of the instruments of Congressional power, such as the control of the purse and of

publicity. Unlike judicial interpretations, administrative interpretations of Congressional intent are usually not confined to a single decision. They are more aptly described as an ongoing process of mutual agreement or at least mutual tolerance between the interested Congressional and administrative parties. For this process to function properly, minimum communication between the branches is necessary.

Obviously in 1948 that minimum communication was not present. All parties seemed to agree; yet there was total disagreement, indicating a lack of consent with responsibility for consequences. The political pressures producing this lack of responsibility may have been drastic. If those analysts who emphasized the importance of the farm vote in 1948 are correct, the outcome of a Presidential election was at stake. In any event the Commodity Credit Corporation charter controversy reveals an undesirable hiatus in our constitutional system which exists when different parties control the legislative and executive branches.

This hiatus may well be a phenomenon reserved for certain election years. Power relationships in the Capitol in 1948 lay in the balance of the November election. In the months preceding this decision the two branches of government were virtually isolated from each other. But this very isolation appears to have allowed the question of election tactics to replace other considerations. Traditional investigatory and expenditure controls by Congress were inoperative. Far from being a captive of the hostile legislature, the President could act unilaterally.

Certainly the legal analysis of the 1948 charter leaves one with the impression that the Administration was placing stumbling blocks in its own path. The Aiken interpretation with all its shortcomings pointed a way out for an Administration seeking a means to furnish emergency storage. But since a sense of *joint* responsibility for a farm program was lacking, it was impossible to carry out a storage program even though all parties were actually in agreement as to its desirability.

*The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The Case of Ohio**

THIS IS AN analysis of the relationship between the ecological structure of Ohio's eighty-eight counties and the structure of their party systems, as reflected in the vote for the Ohio House of Representatives over a period of six elections, from 1946 to 1956.

Problem.

A viable democratic political system, as any social system, has to meet certain internal-structural requisites that can be shown to be functional for achieving the goals of the system. Among the goals of a democratic political system are the continuing crystallization, institutionalization and resolution of social, economic and other conflicts. These goals are mutually interdependent. If conflicts remain uncrystallized, they are unlikely to be institutionalized; and if they are not institutionalized, they are likely to remain unsolved. The political system will be characterized by tensions making for basic political instability.

Among the structural requisites of a stable democratic system is the existence of political parties which, by competing for public support on reasonably even terms, serve as agents of conflict crystallization and institutionalization and, through bargaining and compromise, contribute to the resolution of conflicts of interest. Competitive parties are, therefore, structural requisites of the

* This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council. It is preliminary to an interview survey of the Ohio General Assembly conducted during the 1957 session. Neither the Council nor Antioch College is responsible for the analysis. The author wishes to acknowledge the aid he received in collecting the data from the members of his course, "Methods in Social Science," especially from Mr. Stanley Newman and Miss Susanne Berger.

democratic political system in that they facilitate the achievement of some of its goals, notably the crystallization, institutionalization and resolution of conflicts.

But a political system is not a closed system. It functions within a series of environments which tend to condition its structure. One might mention the prevailing system of class relations, the economic system, the cultural or value system, and so on. Of such environmental systems, the ecological system, i. e., the pattern of the residential distribution of the population, has long been recognized as a major conditioning factor, but the precise relationship between the structure of the ecological system and the structure of the party system has not been widely explored. In his recent *American State Politics* (1956), V. O. Key, Jr. perceptibly analyzed the effect of metropolitan and rural environments on the fortunes of the political parties in sundry states, but he was not primarily concerned with an analysis of the relationship between the structure of the ecological system as an external determinant and the structure of the party system as an internal determinant of the political system.

Hypothesis.

It is a most general hypothesis of this study that there is a direct relationship between the character of an area's ecological structure and the structure of its party system. In particular, the hypothesis is entertained that urban structures are conducive to the existence of competitive party systems and that there is a progressive transition to semi-competitive and non-competitive (one-party) systems as areas are located along an urban-rural ecological continuum. If this hypothesis can be supported, one may speculate that increasing urbanization, especially the expansion of metropolitan areas, is favorable to the extension of a competitive party politics as a structural requisite of the democratic political system.

Theory.

Underlying the hypothesis are some broad theoretical notions about factors in the urban environment which are conducive to

a competitive party system. Without reviewing here the large and often controversial literature of urban sociology, it may be suggested that competitive attitudes, orientations and practices are functions of such major ecological variables as the size, density and heterogeneity of urban aggregates. In particular, the city, in contrast to the open country, is characterized by a greater range of individual variations, a more pervasive segmentalization of human relationships making for membership in widely divergent groups as well as for divided allegiances, a more complicated class structure and heightened social and physical mobility, a greater division of labor and more intense economic rivalry, a wider range of ideas and more secular attitudes. This kind of environment is likely to be more favorable to the development of competitive parties than small town or rural environments where social relationships are more limited and limiting, where sacred values and traditional behavior patterns are cherished, where social and ideological differences are less tolerated, where group memberships are concentric rather than tangential, and so on. In such environments semi-competitive or non-competitive party systems are more likely to predominate.

These theoretical considerations are not meant to imply that the city, as some sociologists have held, is an undifferentiated mass of people characterized by anonymity, impersonality, standardization, or disorganization, as opposed to the country with its presumed friendliness, community spirit, spontaneity of association and mutual aid. Such differentiation does violence to the continuing assimilation of city and country which has been the outstanding feature of ecological development in the United States during the past sixty years or so. "Urban" and "rural," then, are used here as convenient short-hand phrases to denote ecological differences, on the assumption that, in spite of the assimilation process, "rurbanization" has not as yet gone far enough to eliminate all distinctions between city and country. Urban and rural are not to be construed, therefore, as ideal types, but as two poles of a continuum which does not permit radically discontinuous variations as one moves from one end to the other but makes for variations nonetheless.

In order to proceed with the analysis, Ohio's eighty-eight counties had to be classified in terms of their (a) ecological structure, (b) structure of party system, and (c) party dominance. In the following we shall briefly summarize the main steps taken in the preparatory stage of the analysis.

Ecological structure.

The nature of a person's place of residence is an easily available and tangible index of the ecological structure of a county. The United States Census divides the population into three main categories: urban, rural non-farm, and rural. For the purposes of this study the urban and rural non-farm categories were combined,

TABLE 1

Correlation Coefficients for Urban and Rural Non-Farm Residence, and Selected Ecological and Demographic Characteristics of 88 Ohio Counties, 1950 Census Data

Factor	Census Category	Rho
Density	Population per square mile	+ .95
Size	Total population	+ .93
Heterogeneity	Percent foreign-born	+ .68
	Percent non-white	+ .49
Employment	Percent in manufacturing	+ .73
	Percent in agriculture	-.96
Income	Median family income	+ .76
	Percent with less than \$2,000	-.77

on the assumption that due to "rurbanization" non-farm people outside urban areas have attitudes and orientations closer to those of urban than of farm people. In order to test the reliability, if not the theoretical validity, of the combined category as an index of urban structure, it was correlated with other indices of urban and rural differentiation available in the Census. The combined urban and rural non-farm category should correlate highly and positively, for instance, with indices of size, density and heterogeneity of population, as well as with some other relevant demographic characteristics, and it should correlate highly and negatively with rural characteristics. Table 1 presents the correlation coefficients, based on 1950 Census data.

Table 1 indicates that, as expected, very high correlations were obtained between the combined index of urban and rural non-farm residence and the two measures of size and density. The coefficients for the heterogeneity factors vary—that for percent foreign-born being reasonably high, that for percent non-white only moderately high, but both are satisfactory. The high positive and negative coefficients for employment in manufacturing and agriculture, respectively, as well as the income coefficients, further support the discriminatory reliability of the residence criterion as an ecological index.

TABLE 2

Distribution of 88 Ohio Counties by Major Ecological Categories

Category	Description	N	Percent
Metro	All counties in standard metropolitan areas	17	19
Urban	All counties with urban aggregates of 2,500+ population and a ratio of urban and rural non-farm population of more than 80%	10	11
Urban-Rurban	All counties with urban aggregates of 2,500+ population and a ratio of urban and rural non-farm population of 70-80%	31	35
Rural-Rurban	All counties with urban aggregates of 2,500+ population and a ratio of urban and rural non-farm population of less than 70%	19	22
Rural	All counties <i>without</i> an urban aggregate of 2,500+ population	11	13
Total		88	100

However, in order to refine the urban category, a further distinction was made between counties located in metropolitan areas, as defined by the Census, and those not within metropolitan areas, but with urban aggregates of 2,500 population or more. Application of these criteria yielded five major ecological categories ranging from "metro" to "rural." The description of these categories and the distribution of the eighty-eight Ohio counties by these categories are found in Table 2.

Political Structure.

County election data for the Ohio House of Representatives from 1946 to 1956 were analyzed to determine the structure of the party systems in the eight-eight Ohio counties which also serve as election districts. During this period, the Democrats organized the House only in 1948. The election of 1946 was chosen as the starting point of the series as it marked the first "normal" post-war contest.

As a number of counties are multi-member districts, i. e., more than one contest takes place in any one election, the total number of contests in the six elections since 1946 was used as an initial device to classify the counties in terms of competition between the two major parties. A competitive party system district was defined as one in which one of the two parties has won at least 25 percent, or more, of *all* the *contests* in the six elections. On this basis, only sixteen counties, or 18 percent of eighty-eight counties, could be classified as "competitive."

Inspection of the data suggested that in some counties where it had won less than 25 percent of the contests, or none at all, the second party was nevertheless able to stimulate reasonably strong opposition to the dominant party—opposition effective enough to win a contest occasionally, and to keep the dominant party on its toes. It seemed feasible, therefore, to divide the counties not classified as competitive into two categories: (1) semi-competitive, and (2) non-competitive (or one-party) systems.

A semi-competitive system was defined as one where the second party, though winning less than 25 percent of the contests, or none, had won 40 percent or more of the popular two-party vote in *at least four* of the *elections* held between 1946 and 1956. For this purpose, the vote cast in individual contests in multi-member districts was averaged, and the mean vote cast for all party candidates was used as the percentage index. On this basis, another twenty-four counties, or 28 percent of the total, could be classified as semi-competitive.

The residue of counties, forty-eight in all, are the non-competitive (one-party system) districts, where the second party has won less than 25 percent of the contests, or none, and over 40 percent

of the vote in *less than four* of the elections since 1946. Table 3 summarizes the data.

TABLE 3

Distribution of Different Party Systems in 88 Ohio Counties, Based on 1946-1956 Election Data for the House of Representatives

Character of Party System	N	Percent
Competitive	16	18
Semi-competitive	24	28
Non-competitive	48	54
Total	88	100

Party dominance.

For purposes of "control" to be applied in the analysis, it was necessary to define "party dominance" in semi-competitive and non-competitive party systems. A county or district was considered "dominated" by a party if that party had won 75 percent or more of the total number of contests in the period 1946-1956. As Table 4 indicates, the Republican party is overwhelmingly dominant through time in the non-competitive as well as in the semi-competitive counties.

TABLE 4

Party Dominance in Semi-Competitive and Non-Competitive Election Districts for the Ohio House of Representatives, 1946-1956

Party Dominance	N	Percent
<i>Semi-competitive party systems</i>		
Republicans dominant	21	88
Democrats dominant	3	12
Total	24	100
<i>Non-competitive party systems</i>		
Republicans dominant	43	90
Democrats dominant	5	10
Total	48	100

Analysis.

On the basis of the foregoing classifications, a first step in the analysis of the relationship between ecological structure and party-system structure was a complete cross-tabulation of the eighty-eight counties. Table 5 presents the results. Most evident is the marked difference between the metropolitan and the four other

TABLE 5

Ecological and Party-System Structure of Ohio Counties, Derived from 1950 Census Data and Election Results for the Ohio House of Representatives, 1946-1956

Character of Party System	In Percentages				
	Metro N = 17	Urban N = 10	Urban- Rurban N = 31	Rural- Rurban N = 19	Rural N = 11
Competitive	41	10	16	16	0
Semi-competitive	41	50	19	5	45
Non-competitive	18	40	65	79	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100

ecological areas with respect to party competition. Surprisingly, only one of the ten counties classified as urban turned out to have a competitive party system. But none of the rural counties fell into the competitive system category. On the other hand, both metropolitan and urban counties differ significantly from the urban-rurban and rural-rurban counties in the semi-competitive classification. The relatively large percentage of semi-competitive party systems found in the rural counties is partly due to the absence of competitive party systems in that category, but it is also due to the fact that in some scattered counties in the southern part of the state the Democratic party has been able to maintain a certain degree of traditional electoral strength. With regard to non-competitive or one-party systems, the progression increases systematically from the metropolitan structures to the rural-rurban structures, declining slightly in the rural structures due to the relatively strong showing of semi-competitive systems in these rural counties.

Table 5 suggests that it may be permissible, without doing violence to the data, to combine the urban-rurban and rural-rurban ecological categories into a single rurban category. Table 6 presents the re-classification. The table indicates more clearly that some kind of party competition, either of the complete or modified kind, is a quality of metropolitan and urban ecological areas, while non-competitive party systems are predominantly small town and rural phenomena. It may be interesting to note in this connection that the mean size of the largest town in the urban counties is $27,233 \pm 10,800$, in the urban-rurban counties only $12,081 \pm 6,500$, and in the rural-rurban counties a mere $6,088 \pm 874$. In other

TABLE 6

Revised Ecological and Party-System Structure of Ohio Counties

Character of Party System	In Percentages			
	Metro N = 17	Urban N = 10	Rurban N = 50	Rural N = 11
Competitive	41	10	16	0
Semi-competitive	41	50	14	45
Non-competitive	18	40	70	55
Total	100	100	100	100

words, these ecological areas differ not only with respect to the size of their largest urban centers, but, as the standard deviations show, the range of variation declines progressively, suggesting the greater homogeneity at the small town end of the urban-rural continuum. The table points up the small town basis of one party systems in Ohio, while inroads into the rigidity of one party politics are most noticeable in the large percentage of semi-competitive party systems in the urban ecological areas (a pattern disturbed only in the rural category, as explained already). If, as in Table 7, one disregards the difference between competitive and semi-competitive party systems, the relationship between ecological structure and party competition is even more evident. In fact, the table would seem to justify a recombination of the ecological

categories into two single categories, a metropolitan-urban and a rural-rural classification. Table 8 presents the data. Non-competitive or one-party systems now appear even more clearly as correlates of small-town and rural ecological structures, while some form of party competition appears to predominate in the metropolitan and medium-size urban areas.

TABLE 7

Further Revision of Ecological and Party-System Structures, Ohio

Character of Party System	In Percentages			
	Metro N = 17	Urban N = 10	Rurban N = 50	Rural N = 11
Competitive & Semi-competitive	82	60	30	45
Non-competitive	18	40	70	55
Total	100	100	100	100

TABLE 8

Ecological and Party-System Structures Dichotomized, Ohio

Character of Party System	In Percentages	
	Metro- Urban N = 27	Rurban- Rural N = 61
Competitive & Semi-competitive	74	33
Non-competitive	26	67
Total	100	100

However, in spite of the clear nature of the demonstrated relationship, it might be argued that the connection between ecological structure and party system structure is spurious, particularly in the semi-competitive and non-competitive counties. Could it be, for instance, that the predominance of one party systems in the non-metropolitan counties is a function of the overwhelming strength of the Republican party in the state as a whole? In order to deal with the party factor, it seemed advisable to control the

urban and rurban areas by party dominance. Unfortunately, the number of such counties in which the Democratic party predominates is so small (four in all) that the data cannot be properly assessed, though they move in the expected direction. However, if the ecological categories are controlled by Republican dominance, the small town basis of non-competitive party systems in these counties is evident. As Table 9 shows, while the eight Republican-dominated urban counties are equally split between semi-competitive and non-competitive party systems, one party systems are overwhelmingly present in the rurban environments where 82 percent of the Republican-dominated counties have no competitive systems of any kind.

TABLE 9

*Party Systems in Urban and Rurban Counties, Ohio,
Controlled by Party Dominance*

Character of Party System	In Percentages			
	Democrats Dominant		Republicans Dominant	
	Urban N = 1	Rurban N = 3	Urban N = 8	Rurban N = 39
Semi-competitive	100	0	50	18
Non-competitive	0	100	50	82
Total	100	100	100	100

Conclusion.

The data presented in the analysis seem to support the hypothesis that there is a direct relationship between the ecological structure of the counties which serve as election districts for the Ohio House of Representatives and the structure of the party systems in these counties. Competitive party systems, either truly competitive or semi-competitive, seem to be functionally related to metropolitan and urban ecological structures, while non-competitive or one-party systems seem to be functionally related to small town and rural ecological structures. Increasing urbanization would seem to be conducive to the further development of a competitive party system as a structural requisite of the democratic political system.

The Politics of Union Endorsement of Candidates in the Detroit Area

WITHIN the last few decades American labor leaders have been torn from their traditional political indifference and thrust into a position of actively pursuing political aims.¹ Although reluctant, organized labor has found it impossible to escape political responsibilities. In 1944 the Congress of Industrial Organizations founded the Political Action Committee (PAC) and less than four years later the American Federation of Labor created Labor's League for Political Education (LLPE).² As part of the AFL-CIO merger in December, 1955, these organizations were combined on the national level into the Committee on Political Education (COPE), but at present this unity has not filtered down to many of the state and local organizations.

In an effort to generalize informatively about labor's political activities case studies are needed. The case in point in this study is the endorsement and support of candidates for political office by the Political Action Committee (hereafter referred to as the PAC) in the Detroit area, more properly designated as Wayne County. Such a study should serve as a basis for testing Professor V. O. Key's hypothesis that the political activation of labor union

¹ It should be noted that labor participation in politics is not strictly a recent phenomenon dating back no farther than the 1930's. Labor participated in politics as early as 1828 when the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations ran candidates for public office. But under the leadership of Samuel Gompers, political considerations were relegated to a secondary position, emphasis being placed on labor-management relations. See Henry David, "One Hundred Years of Labor in Politics," in J. B. S. Hardman and M. F. Neufeld, eds., *The House of Labor* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 90-112.

² On the formation of the PAC see Joseph Gaer, *The First Round: The Story of the CIO Political Action Committee* (New York: Duel, Sloan and Pearce, 1952).

leaders in urban areas has resulted in a closer and more complete affiliation between organized labor and the Democratic party.³

A study of PAC's endorsement operations in Wayne County is not difficult to justify. First, all county PACs are autonomous groups that have complete discretion as to which candidates they will endorse. In Michigan there is a state PAC that handles endorsements for all state-wide elections; and the national unit of the PAC, now COPE, recommends endorsements for the AFL-CIO with respect to candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency.⁴ The state and national units, however, do not exercise authority in other than an advisory capacity over county PACs. Second, the Wayne County PAC is the political arm of the local unions of the twenty-two industrial and international unions (including the powerful United Automobile Workers) which have a total dues-paying membership of approximately 354,000. Consequently, the PAC here has at its disposal formidable resources both in terms of money and manpower. Finally, and of equal importance, the PAC has been an active and energetic group since its formation in 1944,⁵ having participated prior to this writing in twenty-two major primary and general elections plus numerous non-partisan local and judicial elections. Thus, the PAC in Wayne County is a going concern in a concentrated and dynamic labor area, and the politics involved in endorsing candidates is a promising place to begin a study of labor's role in politics.

This study is based primarily on conversational-type interviews with PAC, Democratic and Republican party leaders in Wayne County, as well as personal observations. The author attended regular meetings of PAC and Democratic party units, many of which were followed by informal social hours. Considerable reliance is placed on the interpretations and impressions of those

³ V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 282.

⁴ The Michigan Federation (AFL) and the Michigan Industrial Union Council (CIO) must complete the state merger before 1958 according to the terms of the AFL's and CIO's merger agreement. Thus, the PAC and LLPE in the Detroit area are entirely independent organizations.

⁵ The forerunners of the PAC in Wayne County were Labor's Non-Partisan League (1938-42) and the Progressive Labor League (1943).

who hold formal positions in the aforementioned organizations. The principal justification of a study thus conceived is that the opinions and actions of those in responsible positions constitute to a considerable extent the politics of an organization.

I. ENDORSEMENT MACHINERY

In 1944 the Wayne County Industrial Union Council established a small committee composed of top CIO officials to review the qualifications of candidates. To allow for the expression of individual union members' opinions on endorsements, however, the Council later set up a series of committees and delegate bodies in each Congressional district within Wayne County. Although this move was hailed by many union members as a means of enabling them to participate more actively, the cumbersome and complicated machinery left the determination of endorsements for major offices primarily in the hands of the top officials. But by no means is the formal organization unimportant, for it serves not only as a method for determining endorsement for candidates for lesser offices, but also as a check on hasty and ill-advised endorsements from the top as well as a recruitment channel for political action representatives. Its description, therefore, should serve a useful purpose. (See Figure 1)

All endorsements of Congressional, state legislative, county, and local candidates, as well as those made by the state and national units of the PAC, are subject to approval by the CIO County Industrial Union Council's Delegate Body. The Delegate Body, composed of 611 delegates elected by the twenty-two affiliated unions on a proportional basis, theoretically is the top policy authority of the PAC. A candidate's record and qualifications are presented to the assembled group by a member of the Executive Board and discussion and debate frequently follow. Candidates do not usually have an opportunity to appear before the Delegate Body. It is necessary to mention that the Delegate Body's large and unmanageable size, plus infrequency of meetings (once or twice before each election), considerably reduce its significance in the endorsement process.

Such recommendations for endorsement of particular candidates

stem from a twenty-three member Executive Board elected by the Delegate Body. This Board acts as a clearing house for recommendations made by the sixty-four member PAC Policy Committee. The Board is empowered to conduct all Council business




FIGURE 1
PAC Endorsement Organization

between Delegate Body meetings. The Board has absolute authority to refuse to follow the recommendations of the PAC Policy Committee. Debates frequently arise between the two agencies as to which candidate to endorse. The Board exercises independent judgment in such matters, but if the Policy Committee remains

adamant it will, however reluctantly, recommend the Policy Committee's preferences to the Delegate Body.

The PAC Policy Committee includes the Coordinator (see below), two members of the PAC's organizations in each of the six congressional districts in Wayne County, plus representatives of the local and international unions. The principal task of the Policy Committee is to screen the recommendations for endorsement made by the district organizations.

Each of the six district organizations in Wayne County, corresponding identically with congressional districts, has its own Delegate Body composed of two workers elected from each precinct. This Body is the most recent addition to the machinery. The Delegate Bodies vary as to size, averaging approximately 400 delegates per district. The function of the District Delegate Body is analogous to that of the County Delegate Body in that it passes on endorsement recommendations made by the District Steering Committee. Since this part of the organization is new, it is impossible to evaluate its significance in the endorsement process.

Each District Steering Committee is composed of a Coordinator and two members who are automatically members of the Policy Committee, plus additional members elected by the precinct workers from their respective zones, each zone having approximately ten precincts. The Steering Committee entertains applications for endorsement and interviews and passes on the qualifications of the candidates who apply in that district. These District Committees are primarily responsible for determining endorsements for candidates for local and state legislative offices, although occasionally they have a strong voice in selecting endorsees for Congressional office.

Each district is assigned a Coordinator (Political Action Education Representative) who is a full-time employee of the County Industrial Union Council. The Coordinator, usually well versed in politics, serves as a liaison agent between the PAC and the Democratic party. He is a member of the Steering Committee and PAC Policy Committee and is also responsible for making known to the district organization the views and information the Council possesses about candidates in its district.

Endorsement is obtained by formal application by the candidate and usually he is interviewed by one of the above units in the district in which he resides. In relatively few instances is endorsement ever granted without application, but this has not always been true; for only in recent years has PAC endorsement been actively sought by candidates. Formerly many feared PAC endorsement was a principal barrier to election success.

Such an elaborate organization has made it easier for internal disagreements to be expressed. Conflicting opinions arise among the various units or a local union may refuse to follow PAC recommendations. PAC leaders are cognizant of this difficulty, but claim that they have no power to control a recalcitrant faction. In fact their only claim on union membership conformity is to the "democratic endorsement process." Thus, the construction of a complicated channel for endorsement purposes provides for the CIO in the Detroit area a more realistic and defensible basis for political action than the less cumbersome alternative of formally centralizing authority in a single committee.

II. CRITERIA FOR ENDORSEMENT

In selecting the endorsee, the PAC intertwines the pragmatic with the ideal. Approaching endorsements from such a view, the PAC attempts to endorse the candidate who most nearly meets the claims of the group and who commands the greatest prestige, but it will endorse the mediocre or weak candidate if he is opposed by a candidate who is closely identified with business groups. Although the criteria are often mutually incompatible, all are weighed and applied together in an attempt to gauge the merits of a particular candidate.

Partisanship

Contrary to the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education's policy, the PAC in Wayne County is clearly partisan. To obtain endorsement for those offices that the parties contest a candidate *must* be a Democrat. Since its formation in 1944, PAC has endorsed only one Republican and one third party candidate for

partisan office, the remainder being Democrats. During the first four years of its existence, the Wayne County PAC consistently affirmed a policy of non-partisanship, even though virtually all of the candidates whom it endorsed were Democrats. A close affiliation between the Democratic party and the CIO began in 1948 when liberal Democrats and CIO leaders coalesced and captured control of the state Democratic party machinery from conservative Democrats. CIO members sought and won positions within the party organization. In Wayne County at present approximately one-half of party members are directly or indirectly affiliated with the CIO. This has meant that the PAC in endorsing candidates has worked almost exclusively within as well as in support of the Democratic party.

The PAC penchant for endorsing Democrats merits further analysis. To a degree, PAC leaders view the party situation in Michigan as atypical. The Democratic party here is thought to be more inclined to take a definite stand on controversial issues than in most states. The party organization is led by Governor G. Mennen Williams and State Committee Chairman Neil Staebler, both regarded by PAC leaders as champions of liberalism. Their leadership, coupled with the unwillingness of the Republican party in Michigan to champion CIO causes, are the principal reasons cited for the marriage of the two groups. August Scholle, state director of the PAC explains the reasons for the PAC's partisanship as follows:

The Democratic party program is satisfactory to us. We decided on a policy of working within the framework of the Democratic party after years of pleading with Republicans to prevent the need for what we are doing. For years Republican legislators had a contemptuous disregard for labor as a unit of people in this state. We had a single party system. PAC is working to at least produce a candidate to run against every Republican candidate in the state. People should have a choice.⁶

Republicans are, of course, much aware of this close affiliation, but claim that PAC leaders speak only for themselves and not for

⁶ As quoted in the *Detroit Free Press*, April 24, 1955.

the union membership.⁷ In any event, PAC leaders are Democrats even though the political preferences and desires of the membership remain a thorny bone of contention.

The PAC's open partisanship is not without problems. For any interest group, active partisanship has always involved the assumption of risk of serious dimensions.⁸ Interest groups, especially labor groups, have avoided forthright identification with one party as opposed to another for fear of losing access to policy-makers should the opposition party win. The PAC in Michigan quite understandably does not have access to the Republican-controlled state legislature,⁹ and even the judiciary has proved to be an inviting position from which Republicans may harass the efforts of organized labor. Probably of even more significance is that many issues are not decided along party lines anyway, and the executive and legislative decision-making process in Michigan offers no exception to this general rule.¹⁰ But the fear most prevalent in the minds of top PAC policy-makers is that explicit advance commitments will disturb the intricate balance of unity within CIO with respect to its present extensive political activities. Although the CIO has demonstrated amazing cohesiveness, at least in the top echelons, a major Democratic defeat could invite deep cleavage among the CIO's membership. A sizeable number of members still feel that a third party is necessary, and, conversely, an even more sizeable group are of the opinion that the strict non-partisan Samuel Gompers' formula of rewarding friends and punishing enemies should be the limit of permissible political activity. At best, these factions are only temporarily reconciled to support a policy of open partisanship.

⁷ Republicans estimate that 40 to 50 percent of the union membership in Michigan vote frequently for Republican candidates.

⁸ See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 299-305.

⁹ For example, the CIO has been unsuccessful in pushing through the state legislature its program dealing with minimum wages, mental health, school aid, conservation, and similar issues.

¹⁰ The index of party cohesion in the Michigan state legislature is highest with respect to those matters dealing with labor. See James F. Herndon, *Party Conflict in the Michigan Legislature: Its Extent and the Nature of Issues Involved as Derived From Roll Call Votes in the Regular Sessions of 1947, 1952, and 1954*, unpublished Master's thesis, Wayne State University (1956).

PAC's partisanship, of course, is not entirely on the debit side. The patently obvious advantage has been that CIO has had preferred access to those endorsees who have won public office. With Williams as governor, PAC leaders have had considerable voice in the appointment of members of Michigan state commissions. In the pre-election period PAC leaders serve on party committees and thus are influential in the drafting of the platform. The PAC, however, does not attempt to dictate party policy since it recognizes the need for the party to remain as inclusive as possible. Finally, the PAC has found that through continuous commitment to the Democratic party it has been able to utilize its endorsement machinery as a weapon to promote a higher degree of party responsibility. Democratic candidates seek PAC support and often alter their views in order to meet PAC demands.

Whether the PAC is suited to testing the talents of politicians is certainly debatable. To impose sanctions upon the Democratic party to make it an effective and efficient agency for the selection of candidates might rob the party of its ability to compromise conflicting interests within the party. In other words, the danger involved is that the Democratic party would be forced to select candidates who would fail to unite the party and attract the voters. But inasmuch as the PAC is contemptuous of Republicans, and inasmuch as the Democratic party has acceded to PAC demands in most instances, a major shift in PAC policy appears highly unlikely.¹¹

Other Criteria

Since many politicians attempt to represent a variety of interests that they can play off against one another, the PAC employs other criteria for the determination of endorsements with the full realization that it will be unable to hammer its program through

¹¹ The merger of the AFL and CIO in Michigan could conceivably alter the institutional and policy arrangements of the PAC. But this appears at present to be unlikely, since the two groups fundamentally disagree as to the type of policy to follow or the extent of political activities. The relationship of the PAC with the political agencies of the AFL has been strained and tense for a number of years and they seldom cooperate on endorsements to be made.

with candidates who have little freedom to act or who continually straddle issues.

The most crucial criterion other than partisanship is whether a candidate is a liberal. Being a Democrat offers some tangible evidence of liberalism in the eyes of the PAC, but this alone is not enough; for party nonconformity flourishes in Michigan as elsewhere and the PAC is not naive concerning the operations of the two-party system. The term "liberal" does not puzzle PAC leaders as it does academicians. A candidate may prove his liberalism by allowing the PAC to evaluate his stand on ten or twelve key and current issues with which the CIO is concerned.¹² The usual method for evaluation of a candidate, however, is to tabulate his recorded votes on such issues. Thus the incumbent has the inside track for endorsement since his votes are a matter of record and he has established some rapport with PAC officials.

The PAC will, however, abandon its idealism and endorse a candidate with an anti-liberal background in order to offer a respectable slate. This is done so as not to jeopardize the chances of its more favored candidates; for failure to endorse or support a popular candidate could conceivably impair the entire PAC slate.¹³ In line with this pragmatic policy, the PAC has endorsed candidates for non-partisan judicial and local office who had Republican backgrounds because they were sure winners and the PAC feared loss of access. Democrats, of course, are critical of this practice, but the PAC is very jealous of its independence in such matters.

In conclusion, the PAC never commits itself to follow any one criterion for endorsement purposes. As a general rule the PAC attempts to endorse the candidate who is the most respected and able in its view, but less principled considerations often govern the endorsement to be made. Charges of maladroitness on the part of PAC leaders are made

¹² The issues the PAC utilizes to judge the relative merits of a candidate depend, of course, on which office he is seeking, national, state, or local.

¹³ For this reason, Detroit's Mayor Albert E. Cobo was endorsed by the PAC for city treasurer in 1945. Today, however, the PAC opposes Cobo for any office because of his anti-labor background dating back to early 1930's.

that are not entirely unfounded,¹⁴ but for the most part endorsements are made openly and honestly. One thing becomes clear in examining the criteria used for endorsement of candidates; that is, the defeat of many union affiliated candidates, candidates who were ineffective campaigners and whose close identification with labor incurred public distrust, has resulted in the adoption of a policy of working with the professionals.

III. TACTICS AND SUCCESS

Tactics

PAC uses all the major media in marshalling support for its endorsees. During the campaign radio and television programs and newspaper articles are used to pour out advice on political action and constantly remind CIO members of the necessity for political cohesion. Evaluation of such efforts is always difficult, but it is generally agreed by PAC leaders that whatever influence they have is dependent primarily on their informal or personal contacts with the members. Each district organization has in its possession a complete list of the names and addresses of union members living in that district, and an attempt is made to reach each member prior to the election. PAC has encouraged and often sponsored the formation of neighborhood political meetings called block parties for the specific purpose of going over the list of endorsed candidates. In a few districts, groups, composed of CIO workers' wives, have held afternoon parties for the discussion of political issues and candidates. PAC attempts to reach union members at the plant as well as in the home. Endorsed slates are discussed in local union meetings—each local and international union having its own political action division for this purpose. Lists of endorsed slates are passed out to the worker, and lunch-hour and coffee breaks at election time are punctuated with political discussions.

PAC leaders provide audiences for endorsed candidates, having

¹⁴ In 1952, the *Wage Earner*, a pro-labor weekly newspaper in Wayne County, brought charges that the PAC was characterized by petty politics and that union political action experts were using their influence to gain patronage appointments. PAC leaders uncovered a few such cases and the persons involved were discharged.

them appear before local union meetings. Many Democratic candidates are anxious for this opportunity to cultivate voter interest in their cause, especially those running for minor office. And not infrequently Republican candidates are invited to appear before union groups although as a general rule they decline. During election periods, the PAC also furnishes the Democratic party with union halls for use as campaign headquarters as well as sound equipment.

The PAC encounters a myriad of problems in implementing its endorsements. The leaders must cope with a large membership scattered in various parts of the county. This taxes the PAC's organization to the limit, and many members are not reached. The PAC regards contacting a member once or even twice before an election as inadequate for the purpose of convincing him to vote, much less support an endorsed slate. Furthermore, the PAC faces an arduous task in attempting to recruit from the ranks of the CIO persons who are familiar with the art of political persuasion. In most campaigns PAC is compelled to rely on the political novice. PAC attempts to remedy this difficulty by distributing short pamphlets for its workers which contain instructions for effective campaigning. An even greater problem lies in the political attitudes of many of the members of the CIO. No matter how elaborate a campaign the PAC conducts, it must constantly battle against the apathy and antipathy these members have toward politics in general. The details of operating any political organization, staffing, funds, stuffing envelopes, etc., are problems for the PAC.¹⁵

Major criticisms have been leveled against the manner in which the PAC supports endorsed candidates. Many non-CIO Democrats contend that PAC workers do not have the "political know-how" necessary to work a precinct properly and are unable to get out the vote. Remaining clusters of old guard Democrats resent PAC intervention in their precincts because it constitutes a threat to their control. They further charge that the PAC organization too closely duplicates the party organization and thus presents

¹⁵ In Michigan, as elsewhere, a hot debate is taking place over the use of union dues for political purposes.

the impression that the CIO is the party. All too frequently, it is also said, that by passing out CIO literature PAC workers have evoked symbols of domination and thereby have alienated many middle-class liberals and independents who would probably have voted Democratic. Despite these difficulties, Democratic party officials are unequivocal in claiming that PAC activity on the precinct level is a crucial factor in the party's election success.

In general, the campaign PAC conducts is designed to win political support for the Democratic party. From the standpoint of political analysis, such campaigns would not rate unusually high if judged by standards of political profundity. Nevertheless, they serve to stimulate an interest in politics and thus contribute to the development of responsible citizenship.

Success

Assessing the value of the endorsement process is difficult and no elaborate effort to make such assessment is attempted in this study. The crucial question is whether there is a "union vote." In the answer to this question lies the significance of PAC endorsement operations.

A partial answer has been provided by a recent study of the 1952 Presidential election. This study, based on detailed interviews of 828 UAW workers in the Detroit area prior to the election and 351 post election interviews, reveals that members of the UAW approve of labor's political activities; they trust labor's voting recommendations, and the great majority cast their ballot accordingly. It was found that UAW members were overwhelmingly Democratic and that they look upon the Democratic party as the party that protects and advances the working people. The most tantalizing suggestive hypothesis emerging from the study is that the overwhelming majority of the workers identify themselves as members of the working class.¹⁶ This means in effect that the political program of PAC is to a considerable extent supported by union membership. Such propositions, however, must meet the test of further analysis.

¹⁶ A. Kornhauser, A. Mayer, and H. Sheppard, *When Labor Votes: A Study of the Auto Workers* (New York: University Books, 1956), pp. 281 ff.

The percentage of endorsees who won public office is also impressive yet less revealing. In the period 1946 to 1955, the PAC endorsement average was 67.5 percent in the primary elections and 91.2 percent in the general elections for Congressional, state, and county offices. In municipal elections for the same period the average is much lower, being a little less than 38 percent. Endorsement has not served to reduce the number of candidates competing for the nomination. Such data are really unreliable for evaluating the effectiveness of PAC for they fail to show whether an endorsee won or lost *because* of endorsement.

In evaluating their own success, PAC leaders are not sure they are reaching the rank and file. It is known that the union members rarely repeat the old demand that politics be kept out of the union and the union be kept out of politics. The results of the 1952 election study were considered encouraging and the PAC gives no indication of abandoning its present political policies. That the candidates themselves feel that union endorsement is important and no longer carries the "kiss of death" is borne out by the large number of applications for endorsement the PAC receives. Within the non-CIO elements of the Democratic party PAC support is desired, but precisely how much it means to the party no one would hazard to guess. Considerable concern is voiced over PAC failures in non-partisan municipal elections and as a result PAC campaigns on the local level have been intensified. The problem PAC encounters in local elections seems to be that the individual union member's political apathy reaches its peak at the same time that the rest of the populace does.

IV. CONCLUSION

PAC activities in this vital labor area add weight to the support of the hypothesis that there is an increasing trend toward a closer affiliation between the Democratic party and organized labor as a result of the political activation of labor union leaders; moreover, the same interest groups apparently no longer determine the policies of both major parties in Michigan. The political arm of the CIO is constantly in close accord with the Democratic party

even though important differences of opinion sporadically arise. Because the PAC mainly endorses and supports Democrats, there is considerable apprehension among both CIO and non-CIO Democrats that the PAC ultimately may give the appearance of dominating or may in fact dominate the party to such an extent as to alienate other important and necessary groups. PAC has attempted to avoid giving this impression and to a considerable extent non-CIO Democrats are satisfied for the present that the PAC is in reality an independent agency that does not attempt to dictate party policy. The overall effect of PAC's political activities in terms of party alternatives has been to force a realignment of Republican forces. Republicans view the Democratic party as the party of labor and themselves as the representatives of the business approach to government. On the surface at least it appears that both major parties have become more cohesive. Whatever relation the PAC had with the Republican party during its ascendancy must always have been tense—for the PAC today speaks of most Republicans in the lowest political terms and vice versa. No one active in Michigan politics has any difficulty in realizing that there are important differences between the two major parties. Republican attempts in the state legislature to prevent the use of union dues for political purposes add weight to the support of this conclusion.

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the PAC in Wayne County demonstrates no desire to adopt the national policy of non-partisanship. PAC abandoned its non-partisan policy somewhat reluctantly, but despite such initial reluctance the PAC presently indicates that it will continue to give its support to the Democratic party as long as it continues to maintain its liberal policies and leadership. But familiarity is often said to breed contempt, especially in an organization as conglomerate as a party. The question is frequently asked whether the PAC leaders will grow weary of their associates.

The World Federation Resolution: A Case Study in Congressional Decision-Making

CONGRESS is the perennial butt of both popular and serious literature on American government. Criticism dwells particularly on the excessive localism of our national lawmakers.¹ Congressmen are said to be overly responsive to the pressures of their constituents. They are agents who dance to the tunes played by their constituents, often found to be local numbers in discordance with what the rest of the nation wants to hear. A good deal of evidence has been accumulated over the years to support such charges. A Congressman from a two-party district who ignores a dominant constituent interest does so at his peril. Representatives from oil or natural gas producing states never vote against those interests. Congressmen from textile districts in New England can be expected to inhibit any free trade inclinations they may have in the face of overruling claims from the old mill towns they represent.² The great attention paid to localism and

¹ This criticism falls into three categories: those who berate our solons for following local as opposed to national public opinion; those who wish that Congressmen would be more amenable to party responsibility rather than to dominant local interest groups; those who wish Congressmen would think more for themselves instead of waiting for the direction of local public thinking.

For the first category see George Gallup, "The People are Ahead of Congress," *Readers Digest*, June, 1942; "The Gallup Poll-Mail is No True Index," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1946. See also the *Report of the American Leadership Panel*, III, No. 3, March, 1946.

The second is well stated by Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes a Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 239, and James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1949.)

For a summary of the development of the third category see James W. Hurst, *The Growth of American Law* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1951), pp. 38-39. Also A. Lawrence Lowell's classic, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1919), pp. 133-134.

² In *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: The Johns

pressure groups in most discussions of Congressional decision-making³ has obscured the fact that constituent pressure is probably not a major factor in governing a large proportion of Congressional behavior. The bulk of public legislation, especially in foreign affairs, does not especially interest the folks back home. Rather than resenting pressure from the grass roots, many Congressmen wish they heard more often from Pocatello and Middle Falls.

PRESSURE ON CONGRESS

Usually constituent pressure is just one of many vectors which impinge on a Congressional decision. Others include: intra-Congressional pressure; administration pressure; interest group influence; party pressure outside of Congress or the home district; and the influence of a personal friend or relative. Legislators also bring to almost every decision they make a pattern of attitudes, stereotypes and convictions. These internal influences mingle and compete with the external pressures which thrust themselves at Congress.

The relative importance of two external pressures—constituent and party pressure—has been painstakingly analyzed by Julius Turner in his *Party and Constituency*.⁴ These two variables can be reached by a study of roll call votes over a period of time and a systematic look at the demography of Congressional districts. But other external forces and, more importantly, the subtleties of internal pressures can best be handled by following Congress in its management of one bill, an effort admirably undertaken by Stephen K. Bailey in *Congress Makes a Law*.⁵

Hopkins Press, 1951.) Julius Turner concluded, "The great majority of Congressmen, yield to the pressures from their constituencies. . . ."

³ Much of what we know of Congress comes from studies of pressure groups and lobbyists. Such books as *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935) by Elmer E. Schattschneider, Peter Odegard's *Pressure Politics, the Story of the Anti-Saloon League* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), and *The Lobbyists* (Boston: Atlantic Little, Brown, 1951) by Karl Schriftgiesser, to choose three that were influential in their day, weaned two generations of students on the notion that Congress is a meeting place for pressure politicians.

⁴ Turner, *op. cit.*

⁵ Bailey, *op. cit.*

Legislation which deals with foreign affairs or defense policy, increasingly important segments of legislation, especially fails to draw constituent or party pressure. On such questions internal influences may be of decisive importance, as Robert Dahl has tried to indicate.⁶ How much the picture of Congressmen as responding machines rather than thinking beings ought to be revised is difficult to say without more evidence than we have. Such evidence may be accumulated by the case method, by a careful analysis of all of the factors which bear on the making of one legislative decision. The purpose of this article is to show how, in one case, external influences, especially pressure group constituent activity, could not explain the widespread sponsorship of an important foreign policy resolution even when superficial evidence implied such an explanation. The purpose is furthermore to suggest that the importance of constituent pressure as a determinant of Congressional decision making is declining.

THE WORLD FEDERATION RESOLUTION

On June 7, 1949, ninety-one members of the House of Representatives, the largest number ever to sponsor a foreign policy resolution, introduced identical resolutions intended to express the willingness of the Congress of the United States to join a world federal government. Within eight months they were joined by twenty more of their colleagues, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously voted in executive session to bring the resolution to the floor.

Suddenly the resolution died. It waited for a rule from the Rules Committee to bring it to the floor which never came. Despite the fact that the sponsors included fifteen members of the twenty-five-man Foreign Affairs Committee, the Democratic whip, and the chairmen of three major committees, the resolution was never debated in Congress.

The story of the origin of the resolution, its history and demise will be told elsewhere by the writer. The major objective here

⁶ Robert Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), Chapter I, "The Congressman and His Beliefs."

is to assess the relative importance of the factors which persuaded so many legislators to sponsor a resolution calling for world federation.⁷ Sponsorship is at the same time something less and something more than a vote. It is not final, and there is time, consequently, to change one's mind. On the other hand, sponsorship may mean a commitment not just to go along with legislation but to get behind it. What is astounding is not that the world federation resolution failed in Congress, but that so many legislators sponsored it in the first place.⁸

THE UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS

The resolution was drafted and promoted by representatives of the United World Federalists, an organization working to change the United Nations into a world federal government. UWF, just two years old, had grown from an amalgam of five world government groups which merged deficits and dwindling memberships in February 1947 into an organization of 43,000 dues-paying members and an annual budget of \$288,698. Members were clustered in 708 "chapters" throughout the country.

More significantly, UWF had acquired a slick Washington operation. The Washington office was headed by Theodore Waller, who was hired in February 1948 after concluding a successful tour of duty as field director for the Committee for the Marshall Plan. Prior to that he was chief of the UNRRA mission to Byelorussia, 1945-47. On Waller's shoulders fell the task of mobilizing Congressional support for the UWF program. Actually, UWF spent only \$12,825 directly on Congressional lobbying in 1949, most of that going for Waller's salary and secretarial help, but the organization's educational and propaganda efforts were

⁷ The writer, by virtue of his closeness to the resolution as National Secretary of the United World Federalists and subsequent access to UWF files, had an unusual opportunity to do this.

⁸ Professors Bernard Hennessey of the University of Arizona and Philip Sirotkin of Wellesley College have pointed out that Congressmen frequently sponsor legislation to be good fellows without really thinking hard about its significance. In this case, there was very little of that. Almost half of the sponsors actually appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee to testify in its behalf, an extraordinary proportion.

largely geared to political activity in Congress and in state legislatures.

Waller set to work with a professional acumen that surprised even some of his boosters. He stirred the grass roots to letter writing and sending delegations to Washington, and he mustered the support of labor, farm, and other organizations. He also held a series of breakfast meetings with Congressmen in order to discuss federalism, and arranged for favorably inclined members to present UWF's program to their less convinced colleagues. In Brooks Hays (D) of Arkansas he found someone who was convinced of the urgency of the UWF message and was willing to lead the world federation sponsoring group. Waller's efforts were successful beyond his own hopeful predictions. He and Hays were able to enlist 111 members of the House to sponsor the world federation resolution.

ADMINISTRATION AND INTRA-CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE

At the outset there was no pressure from the party leadership in either party to sponsor or not to sponsor House Concurrent Resolution 64, the world federation resolution. During the hearings on the measure the Democratic Administration made its hostile feelings known through the State Department, and Chairman Kee (D) of West Virginia and other party stalwarts subsequently deferred to Administration influence, but not one word of opposition came while Waller and Hays were recruiting sponsors. Actually, a higher proportion of House Democrats (32.2 percent) than Republicans (16.9 percent) became sponsors.

Intra-Congressional pressure is always difficult to calculate. On any vote a certain number of Congressmen will be influenced by the behavior of colleagues they trust. In this case there was only one clear example of such pressure resulting in sponsorship. Brooks Hays, as leader of the federalist group, was able to enroll four of his five Arkansas colleagues as sponsors. But none of the leading sponsors—Hays, Judd (R. Minnesota) or Mansfield (D. Montana)—actively log-rolled in behalf of the measure, and there were probably not more than a half dozen sponsors who joined the group out of deference to another Congressman.

PRESSURE GROUP AND CONSTITUENT PRESSURE

The absence of party or Administration pressure at the outset is not surprising. The relatively small role played by intra-Congressional pressure is understandable because of the nature of the enterprise. Congressional prime movers would not be expected to promise favors or trade benefits to win half-hearted sponsors for a long range foreign policy resolution that would not even have the force of law. The expected explanation for sponsorship lay in a combination of pressure group and constituent activity. But the logical hypothesis—that sponsorship was most often a function of constituent pressure group influence—met with negative results when tested.

MEASURING UWF PRESSURE AT THE GRASS ROOTS

In order to correlate the strength of UWF in Congressional districts with the distribution of sponsorship, it was necessary to constitute criteria to gauge pressure group grass roots activity. Fortunately there were enough data in the UWF files to provide useful, although rough, indices for measuring pressure in Congressional districts in support of the world federation resolution. In November of 1949 Waller sent questionnaires to all UWF chapter chairmen and to some state branches asking for membership figures for the Congressional districts in which they were located and whether or not an active UWF political action committee had been constituted in those districts. Waller also asked if sponsors were getting local press coverage on their support for HCR 64 and if they had been interviewed locally by UWF chapter representatives during the fall recess. As for the sponsors themselves, Waller asked them to report on the extent of mail support they were getting from their districts.

In all, the answers to Waller's questions indicated four possible sources of constituent pressure. If pressure is defined as any factor likely to influence a decision without regard to saliency, then, by definition, *ex post facto* evidence of constituent pressure was experienced by any Congressman who a) came from a district with a large UWF membership (100 members or more would be considered large); b) received fair-to good mail support; c) was

interviewed locally by UWF supporters; d) received favorable local press coverage.

Of the 475 chapters which were sent questionnaires, only 175 responded. Some state branches did provide supplementary material. The lack of response to the Washington office's questionnaire suggests that even at the apex of UWF activity, only a minority of the chapters were organized for political action. There was no response at all from federalists in fifteen states,⁹ and answers from Michigan and Texas revealed that no one in either state was responsible for UWF political action. Remarkably enough, federalists could boast fifteen sponsors from those seventeen states.

The poor response meant that Waller received Congressional district membership figures from only 149 districts, a little more than 34 percent of all. Of these, 59 were represented by sponsors. Altogether there were 78 sponsor districts for which membership figures were available, since an additional 19 were known to have no membership at all. Reliable information on constituent activity was available for 91 districts in all.¹⁰

The overall results found below reveal that only six out of ten sponsors experienced constituent pressure of any kind.

TABLE 1

Constituent Pressure on World Federation Sponsors

Constituent activity	Number of sponsors
(1) UWF membership of 100 or more.....	34
(2) Less than 100 members but fair or better mail support..	26
(3) Less than 100 members, fair to good mail support not reported, but local press coverage.....	5
(4) Less than 100 members, fair to good mail support not reported, no press coverage, but recess interview....	1
TOTAL	66
Total number of sponsors.....	111
Per cent of sponsors who experienced constituent pressure..	59.9

⁹ These were: Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wyoming, Utah.

¹⁰ There were twenty districts for which no statistics were available. All but five of these twenty were in states where UWF had little membership in

There were actually more sponsors (36) with fewer than 35 UWF members in their districts than with 100 or more (34). It is reasonable to infer that at least 45 sponsors supported the world federation resolution for some other reason than constituent pressure.

Probably the influences which motivated sponsorship were more subtle than overt pressure from any source. The Secretary of one UWF state branch wrote, "I am inclined to think it was a matter of conviction rather than political consideration."¹¹ The chairman of the Florida state branch (Florida had five sponsors) admitted, "I am somewhat at a loss to explain their support. . . . The headlong action of the Florida House of Representatives in rescinding world federation measures last spring, suggests strongly that the support of our Congressman for HCR 64 was based far more on conviction than on political consideration."¹² From Indiana, where UWF had only 236 members but five sponsors, the chairman of the state branch wrote, "These men had little support from here beyond some letters from me and a few scattered federalists."¹³

SPONSORSHIP AND POLICY ATTITUDES

Most of the sponsors were Democrats, as previously noted. Moreover, the party unity records as measured by the percentage of times a Representative voted with a majority of his party on sixty-five roll call votes, showed that regular Democrats and irregular Republicans tended to become sponsors.¹⁴ The apparent

December 1949. Since no report came from chapters in the remaining five districts, it is reasonable to infer that pressure there was non-existent.

¹¹ To the author from George Lewis II, Dec. 28, 1951.

¹² To the author from Mrs. P. B. Stovin, Jan. 2, 1952.

¹³ To the author from Charles C. Price, Dec. 14, 1951.

¹⁴ Party unity is measured by the percentage of times a representative votes with a majority of his party. The *Congressional Quarterly News Features* (Washington) reproduces party unity records for all Congressmen each legislative session. In this case party unity records for the first session of the 81st Congress were consulted.

Of the nine Democrats who had perfect party unity records (100 percent), eight were federalists. Of the six maverick Republicans who voted with a majority

affinity of Republican and Democratic sponsors on policy issues was underscored by an examination of their voting records. The vast majority of sponsors, to judge by their votes, were—in the parlance of our time—"internationalists" and "liberals."

Twelve roll call votes were examined to compare the relative internationalism and liberalism of sponsors and non-sponsors.¹⁸ On every one, Republican sponsors were more liberal and internationalist than GOP non-sponsors, and Democratic sponsors more than non-sponsoring Democrats.

TABLE 2

Percentage of Liberal Votes of Sponsors and Non-Sponsors

Democrats	% liberal	Republicans	% liberal
Sponsors (82)	79.6	Sponsors (29)	40
Non-sponsors (181)	68	Non-sponsors (142)	22

of their party less than half the time, five became sponsors. While over 35 percent of the GOP non-sponsors achieved 90 percent party unity records, less than half of the Republican sponsors were that regular. Other statistics could be mustered to show the same thing. GOP sponsors were less Republican than non-sponsors. Sponsoring Democrats were more regular than colleagues on their own side of the aisle.

¹⁸ It was possible to compare the voting liberalism and internationalism of sponsors and non-sponsors by using the criteria employed by the magazine *New Republic* for that purpose. The *New Republic* used thirty roll call votes to score Congressmen on its liberalism scale. The writer chose twelve roll call votes from the *New Republic* list in order to guard against inevitable ambiguities. There would be too much disagreement among political scientists, if not *New Republic* readers, as to whether a vote for Taft-Hartley or farm surpluses was liberal or not, or whether a vote to aid Chiang-Kai-Shek was internationalist. For the record the roll call votes chosen were on: a move to kill the reciprocal trade program; a vote to authorize funds to continue the Marshall Plan; a motion to recommit the Foreign Economic Assistance Act with instructions to strike out technical assistance; a motion to reduce sharply the total amount of foreign aid; a sixty million dollar economic aid authorization for Korea; a vote to eliminate a social security restriction on contributions to states which failed to meet social security standards; a motion to delete provisions in the Housing Act for loans to co-operatives; the extension of federal rent controls; a motion to exempt the steel and cement industries from certain anti-trust regulation; a motion to control commodity speculation; a bill to exempt natural gas producers from FPC jurisdiction; a bill outlawing the poll tax.

On some issues such as Point Four, when only 9.2 per cent of the GOP non-sponsors voted for it compared to 64.3 percent of the Republican sponsors, the differences were considerable.

The voting behavior of sponsors and non-sponsors, in the absence of external forms of pressure, strongly suggests that policy attitudes and convictions had a good deal to do with the decision for many in the House to sponsor or not to sponsor. In cases where constituent pressure was virtually absent, such as in Indiana, UWF was able to persuade liberal Congressmen to sponsor HCR 64. In other areas where constituent pressure was strong, such as Iowa, conservative Congressmen refused to sponsor the world federation resolution.

It has already been pointed out that constituent pressure was relatively non-existent in Indiana. Yet that state produced five sponsors. All were freshmen Congressmen with pronounced liberal and internationalist views. Examination of the voting records of sponsors and non-sponsors in the other two central states of Illinois and Ohio showed that sponsors were sharply more liberal than non-sponsors there too.¹⁶

Of course, when some issue vitally affected a dominant local interest, federalists joined non-sponsors from their area in protecting that claim. On the Natural Gas Act amendment the sponsors from Oklahoma combined with a majority in the House to favor natural gas producers against consumer interests. All sponsors from Pennsylvania helped colleagues from that state to exempt big steel from certain anti-trust restrictions. But the overall liberal-internationalist voting pattern of sponsors is clear.¹⁷

There were twenty-seven Congressmen representing districts with one hundred or more UWF members who refused sponsorship. In nineteen of these districts UWF had over 150 members and active political committees. Of these nineteen non-sponsors experiencing considerable constituent pressure, one was a member

¹⁶ As measured by the imperfect criteria used by the *New Republic*, fifteen sponsors from the three central states had an 83.1 percent liberal voting record compared to 36.5 percent for non-sponsors.

¹⁷ Only seven sponsors had illiberal voting records. In each case sponsorship could be traced to an imperfect understanding of what the world federation resolution meant; i.e., that it might drive Russia out of the UN.

of the American Labor Party, five were Democrats, and thirteen were Republicans. They voted the liberal-internationalist position on the twelve roll call votes merely 34.1 percent of the time, compared to 69.4 percent for sponsors.

A few examples will illustrate this point still further. There were four hundred UWF members and an active political committee in California's eleventh Congressional district in December 1949. Non-sponsor Ernest Bramblett (R) had a 25 percent liberal-internationalist record. In the seventh district, represented by John J. Allen, Jr. (R), UWF had 158 members and an active political committee. Mr. Allen, who had only a 25 percent liberal-internationalist record, did not sponsor HCR 64. On the other hand, a combined total of merely thirty-five UWF members lived in California's eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth Congressional districts. The 88.6 percent liberal-internationalist voting record of Clyde Doyle (D), Chet Holifield (D), and Cecil F. White (D) probably explains their sponsorship.

The dearth of sponsors from Iowa shows how UWF constituent pressure could not make federalists out of conservative-isolationist Congressmen. In Iowa UWF had an effectively led conservative state branch. Yet no sponsor came from either of the two districts where UWF had more than one hundred members because of the extreme conservatism of both representatives as indicated by their 36 percent liberal record. Out of ten opportunities to cast internationalist votes in the first session of the 81st Congress these two did so just once.

SUMMARY

The major finding in this case was that a positive attitude toward world federation was positively correlated with a liberal and internationalist approach to politics regardless of party or constituent pressure, whereas pressure group-grass roots activity could not explain sponsorship for almost half of the sponsors.

Sponsors tended, with few exceptions, to be Congressmen who were favorably disposed toward the growth of international organization, foreign economic aid, national welfare programs, and national regulation of economic activity. They tended also to

have firm convictions that the UN was a worthy first step, that the great powers could not reconcile differences in the UN because it lacked authority and power, and that something ought to be done to strengthen the UN into a world government.¹⁸

The primary inference to be drawn from such a finding is that internal influences probably play a crucial role in shaping comparable legislative decisions.

The conclusion here is not that attitudes and convictions alone were responsible for sponsorship.¹⁹ The conclusion in this case is a negative one. Constituent pressure was an inadequate explanation for sponsorship. It is probably inadequate to explain many Congressional decisions, especially in the area of foreign and defense policy. And as the proportion of foreign and defense legislation increases, the caricature of parochial-pressure-politician Congressmen wrought by popular critical humor and serious criticism will have to be revised.

¹⁸ Fifty-two of the sponsors consistently made these points in their testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

¹⁹ Aside from recognizing the validity of multiple causation in such cases, the writer realizes that there may be some third variable which accounts for the liberalism of the sponsors and their support of HCR 64. It is possible that personality factors correlate significantly with liberalism in Congress. It is likely that certain constituency characteristics correlate with liberalism and internationalism as Turner has shown, *op. cit.* But the main point of this article is not to account for liberalism in Congress but to show that sponsorship of HCR 64 cannot be explained by direct constituent pressure. To meander down the paths of personality analysis or even constituency analysis to account for liberalism in Congress would be a major undertaking, especially when the writer already knows that a disproportionate number of sponsors came from both metropolitan districts and rural districts in the mountain states and that personality types of all kinds could have been found in the sponsoring group.

*The Politician and the Career in Politics**

THIS STUDY concerns politicians—the reasons they entered politics and their attitudes toward a political career. The data were drawn from interviews with sixteen candidates for public office from the western Massachusetts area.¹

No claim can be made that they are representative of all candidates for office or even of all candidates in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, if for no other reason than that it is likely that the characteristics of candidates for public office are determined in part by the character of the constituency in which they are running. Allowing for local and regional differences, however,

* This study was conducted as part of courses in American political parties given at Amherst and Mt. Holyoke colleges in the fall of 1956. As a part of their course work the students were required to work with a candidate for office in his campaign. The interviews were administered after the election by the students themselves.

The author would like to thank Professor Victoria Schuck of Mt. Holyoke College and Mr. Kermit Morrissey for their help in the conduct of the study.

¹ One point is worth noting about the way in which the interviewing was done. Previous experience at Amherst in using students as interviewers had shown that they tended to become "interview-bound." That is to say, the dual task of asking questions, especially where the questions were of the open-end type, and recording answers proved too much to handle for many. What suffered in this case was fulness of response so that the use of probes was diminished and, consequently, the usefulness of the interview as a whole diminished.

An attempt was made to alleviate this condition by using two students on each interview, one instructed to ask the questions, and the other to record responses. It was hoped that this procedure would minimize the inevitable shortcomings that stem from the use of interviewers who are not fully trained, and in general it can be said that the experiment was a success. Responses were more fully transcribed and probes used than in any of the previous studies at Amherst and Mt. Holyoke that used undergraduates as interviewers. This is, of course, an expensive procedure with respect to the use of manpower, but in a study such as this, with a small sample and a great reliance on open-end questions, the result, in terms of interview quality, certainly justified the expense.

there is no reason to believe that politicians in western Massachusetts are in any other way different from politicians elsewhere.

Of the candidates interviewed, six were incumbents of the office for which they contested and ten were non-incumbents. There were eight Democrats and eight Republicans and the sample included eight winners and eight losers. The sixteen covered races for four different offices: two ran for the Governor's Council, two for the United States House of Representatives, one was a candidate for the State Senate, and eleven were contesting for the State House of Representatives. The educational background of the sixteen men and their occupations at the time they first ran for public office are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

<i>Education</i>		<i>Occupation</i>	
Law school	5	Professional	5
College degree	3	Business	7
High school	7	Government	2
Grade school	1	Laborer	2
	<u>16</u>		<u>16</u>

TABLE 2

<i>Previous Political Experience</i>	
Held elective office	7
Held appointive office	5
Official party post	4
Ran for office	2
Worked for party or candidate	13

Table 2 shows that the members of the sample, collectively, had a wide background in politics before they ran for office. None of the candidates was without prior political experience at the time he first ran for office. Seven men were running for elective posts for the first time in this election but three of those had previously held an appointive position, one had held an official position in the party hierarchy and the other three had at least worked for other candidates in the past. In western Massa-

chusetts, at least, the opportunity to run for office does not usually come to the neophyte; some background of service to the party is necessary.

THE DECISION TO RUN FOR OFFICE

After one has said that prior service to the party seems to be a prerequisite to candidacy for office, much still remains to be said, for there are clearly many more party workers than candidates. The question is, then, What distinguishes those who become candidates from those who do not? While candidates for office often talk in terms of "popular demand" for their services as motivating forces, the evidence of this sample indicates that self-selection was at least as important as outside pressures. The sample was asked, "Now, I would like to ask you about your decision to run for political office. Who was it who suggested you run for office?" The largest single group, seven, alleged that it was purely their own idea. One candidate said, "I suggested it. Unless a man himself has the desire to run he probably won't." This man's desire stemmed from his 'teens. Another responded, "No one suggested my running. I had thought about running for representative a year before. A good friend of mine was alderman and when he decided not to run I thought I would try; I did not want to oppose him. I thought it would be a good way to become better known and to gather experience."

Of the sixteen, only four were approached from inside the party. The others were first approached by friends, relatives, or co-workers. It is interesting to note that the genesis of the decision to run bore no relation to its ultimate success. Of the self-selected group, four won and three lost; of the party-recruited group, two won and two lost. There is some reason to suggest that the parties, themselves, in western Massachusetts were neither noticeably active nor notably successful as recruiters.

Even more important than the origin of the decision to run is the question of why, once the opportunity arose, these men decided to make the race. In other words, What motivated them to make the commitment to a political career that is implied by the decision to run for office? In response to the direct question, "What were

the most important arguments in favor of your making the run?" nine members of the sample gave primarily issue-oriented responses ranging from a generalized dissatisfaction with the incumbent officeholder or a desire to "help people," to the desire to press for the passage of a single piece of legislation. The remaining seven stressed the personal value of public office as a means of social or financial advancement or in terms of increased prestige. In some responses all of these elements appeared. One man said, "One of the most important arguments was a desire for personal prestige, the natural desire to be liked. Win or lose, running for political office would enhance my law practice. Furthermore, I would naturally like this good paying office for two years and, less practically, I would have liked the office because I feel that I can be a good and helping influence on others' lives."

Without questioning the sincerity of the issue or social-service motives, it is probable that such responses represent something less than the whole motivational picture. This can be seen more clearly in the responses to the question, "From what you have seen in politics, what would you say are the most important reasons men have for going into politics?" Here, the issue or social-service motive disappeared from the picture almost entirely and was replaced by a fairly clear picture of self-interest in which the most important elements were personal advancement and prestige. Eight of the men specifically mentioned the prestige motive and several others, while not mentioning it specifically, implied it in their responses. As one candidate said about prestige as a factor, "Even crooks want prestige."

The pattern of these responses raises an interesting question: If politics is viewed generally as such a low prestige profession, why do politicians, themselves, see the prestige motive as such an important one, both for other politicians and, by inference at least, for themselves? The answer may lie in a very perceptive remark made by one of the candidates: "People enter politics because of the friendships they can build up and the services they can render. Financial reasons?—that depends on what you were before. In my case it was an incentive. Rise socially?—for me too. I also wanted to get into a better intellectual climate." The key

phrase, of course, is "that depends on what you were before." Prestige and respect are, after all, relative matters. The step from the ministry into politics may entail a loss of prestige, but the step from the factory into politics may carry with it a great deal of added prestige and respect.

In this context two facts about this group of politicians should be noted. In the first place, a comparison between the politicians' occupations before they entered politics and the occupations of their fathers shows that thirteen of the sixteen had higher status jobs than did their fathers. The other three were in equal status occupations. Second, it should be noted that for seven members of the sample, a political post represented a move up the status scale and for four of those seven the shift was from a blue collar to a white collar position. Of the nine other candidates, five were lawyers, for whom a political career had some practical advantages. Only one member of the sample was conceivably threatened by a loss of status, and he was a retired bank president for whom occupational status would presumably not be a major consideration. While job status is probably not identical with prestige, it is not without significance that this group of politicians was characterized by strong upward mobility.

This should not be taken to mean, however, that these politicians were unaware of popular attitudes about politics. Actually, when asked how most people felt about men in politics, eight responded that politicians were not too highly respected, five gave equivocal answers, and four felt that people respected men in politics. But again, the prestige dimension is more meaningful when put in relative terms. Asked to compare politicians and businessmen, eight members of the sample saw politicians equal to or higher than businessmen in public respect. Comparing politicians and lawyers, eight again saw politicians equal to or higher than lawyers.² For the individual concerned about prestige or respect and considering a political career, the important question would seem to be not whether politics is a high or low prestige profession but what it is higher than or lower than.

² The two questions were, "Compared to businessmen would you say people in politics are more respected, about the same, or less respected?" and "How

THE POLITICIAN AND ATTITUDES ABOUT POLITICS

It is a truism that the way an individual performs his job will be in part determined by the way he conceives of it. In order to understand what the politician does, then, and why he does it, it is necessary first to know what he thinks he is doing and how he thinks about it. The sixteen men in the sample were asked a series of questions, therefore, about the job of politics, and their responses to these questions form an interesting picture. The first part of the picture is the politician's conception of what a successful politician is like. The sample was asked, "What do you think are the most important characteristics and abilities a person needs to be successful in politics?" One man summed up this way, "Friendly, courteous—as a matter of fact you could just go through the Boy Scout law." Take the Boy Scout oath, add a touch of Madison Avenue and garnish with some Dale Carnegie and the result is the politician's conception of the qualities needed to be a success in politics. Personality, sincerity, speaking ability, and the ability to "get along" with people were stressed about equally. One man specified above average intelligence while five said that just "average intelligence" was needed. The abilities that were stressed could be summed up under the heading of "public relations" skills and there is further evidence to suggest that these men think of politics not in terms of technical abilities needed for office but rather of the manipulative skills needed for success in inter-personal relations.

The sample was asked, "What specific things that you do in politics do you like the best?" Four men rated high as a source of satisfaction some aspect of official duties such as "the give and take of debate" or "getting to know the issues." Interestingly enough, only two of the four were incumbents of an office. The other two were anticipating satisfaction from the office for which they were contesting. On the other hand, fourteen of the sixteen found in their contacts with people a source of satisfaction and for nine of the fourteen these contacts represented the thing they

about compared to lawyers? Are men in politics more respected, about the same, or less respected?"

liked best about politics. This "human relations" theme, but with a twist, can be seen also in the aspects of politics these men liked least. The single largest group, six, complained about having to deal with people who "only want favors." While there was little objection to doing favors—indeed, this was generally seen as an important function of the politician—there seems to be a code involved and the person who violates the code by being too single-minded in his self-interest, risks the approbation of the politician.

A third place in which the "human relations" theme can be seen is in the politicians' evaluation of whether they are better or worse off as a result of their experience in politics. All sixteen candidates, winners and losers alike, professed to have benefited from their political activity. The largest group spoke in fairly clear self-interest terms; that is to say, they gained financially or in social status, or in prestige. The next largest group, six members of the sample, said that the greatest benefit they received from politics came in the opportunity to meet new people and make new friends. It is interesting to note again, that though the question was unstructured³ only one man, an incumbent representative, claimed to have derived great benefit from some aspect of the official duties of his office and that was a somewhat vague reference to the "education" his duties in the legislature had given him.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the politician's view of people contains an element of conflict. The conflict arises when "the people" become "the electorate." It is noticeable in some responses that an euphoric, almost sentimental, view of people as constituents or as friends is translated into a hearty cynicism of people as voters. One man, for example, claimed that "people vote the party line rather than objectively, and they are easily swayed by pomp." Another asserted, "Voters do not appreciate the qualities of good candidates but his friends and intelligent [sic]

³ Incumbents and winners were asked, "Do you think that as a result of your political career, you are better off personally than when you started? Why do you say that?" Losers were asked, "Do you think that your race for office helped you in any way? Do you think you are better off than you were before? Why do you say that?"

people do. Most voters vote on prejudice and not on the men or the issues."

As might be expected, this view of the electorate is most evident among losing candidates, but traces of it can be found among the winners, as well. As one of the winners said, "In politics a man must be popular to gain the support of the people. Elections are a popularity contest."

Such views as these are, of course, not incompatible with the desire to help, meet, work with, or manipulate, people. But it is at least a good working hypothesis that this picture of the behavior of the electorate will condition the way in which they conceive of their own role as representative of a constituency.

SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH

The findings from this study suggest areas that could be fruitfully explored in further research on other groups of politicians. The first area concerns the role of prestige as a motivating force on the decision to enter politics. The importance of politics as an avenue of economic and social advancement is fairly well known. The conditions under which a career in politics serves the needs of the individual in search of greater prestige or respect are less well documented. The evidence from the present study indicates that the drive for prestige is, in fact, an important motivating force. Assuming the validity of this finding there remain to be isolated and analyzed the type of person for whom the need for prestige is great and the conditions under which such a person will turn to politics to fulfill that need. With respect to the latter, the present data suggest a hypothesis worth investigating: the prestige-seeking individual will turn to politics if he sees a political career as being more prestigious than his present activity and more prestigious than possible alternatives. The value of this hypothesis lies in the fact that it makes no *a priori* assumptions about the prestige value of a political career but leaves that to be settled by the individual's own perceptions. It also should not be overlooked that the decision to enter politics may imply a rejection of other possible alternatives. It is conceivable that some of

those alternatives could be seen as more prestigious than politics, itself, but that other characteristics of a political career such as relative ease of entry and the lack of formal qualifications will tip the balance toward the career in politics. All of these conditions remain to be spelled out.

A second area which the present data show to be promising for further research is the politician's perception of his own role. The stress that these politicians placed on the "public relations" skills necessary in politics and the satisfaction derived from interpersonal relations varies substantially from what might be called the "editorial writer" view of public office, which tends to stress abilities more closely related to official aspects of the job, although it is quite in keeping with the role of the politician that was suggested at the outset, that is, the politician as a mediator of conflicting interests and as a manipulator of public consent. It is not too much to suggest that meaningful limits cannot be placed on the role of the politician and office-holder until there is some understanding of the way in which he conceives his own role. It should be noted, too, that the two conceptions of the politician suggested above are not necessarily incompatible. Indeed, one member of the sample who stood with the others in stressing the importance of the public relations skills nevertheless has a reputation as a "good" legislator and took considerable pride in his legislative work. The question would seem to be one of balance, that is to say, a balance between the public relations skills and other more technical skills of office; and the task of assessing the balance and determining the relative weight of the various parts of the balance under varying conditions and for different men is one for research.

Some avenues along which this investigation might proceed can be suggested. The questions in this study were phrased in terms of "the job of the politician" and "the career in politics." It is possible that the politician distinguishes, in his own mind, between his role as a politician and his role as an office-holder, and that he would see differences in the behavior expected of him in each of those roles. Such a dualism would not be surprising in view of the common public distinction that is made between the "politician" and the "public servant." Almost any man with experience

in elective office is likely to know that in order to be a good public servant he must be a good politician as well, but it would be important to an understanding of the behavior of the politician to know if he sees this conflict and if he does, how he resolves it.

Finally, the third area in which further research is warranted covers the relationship between the politician and his constituency. The data suggest that this may be at least a twofold relationship; the politicians studied here seem to think of their constituents in two different ways. In their first role constituents are people who can be helped and manipulated and the politician can derive a great deal of satisfaction from them in this role. In the second of their roles, though, constituents are acting as the electorate; they are judging the politician and perhaps not by standards that he considers acceptable. On the basis of this study all that can be said is that some of the politicians, by inference, made such a distinction and talked differently about their constituents in each of their two roles. Further research could make specific the differences which the politician sees in the two roles of his constituents and the ways in which this perception shapes his behavior toward them.

This is a particularly important question because it bears on the heart of representative government—the relationship between the representative and those he represents. Thus far, investigation in this area has generally followed a one-way street; something is known of what people think about politicians but little is known of what politicians think about their constituents. Some important questions can be raised here: How does the politician view voting behavior? Does he see the electorate as informed or uninformed? To what types of appeals is the voter most likely to respond, in the eyes of the politician? What standards does the politician see the electorate as using in their judgment of elected officials? Are these, in the view of the politician, proper standards and if not, why not? This catalogue of questions that ought to be asked and answered could be lengthened considerably and anyone who has thought about the problem could add a host of new areas not even mentioned here. The point is that the way the politician perceives his constituency will shape his behavior toward them, his performance as a politician, and ultimately, the nature of public policy.

Significance of Congressional Races with Identical Candidates in Successive District Elections

I. THE PROBLEM

In over forty districts in each of the past two Congressional elections, voters had the same candidates to choose between as in the previous contest. This constitutes an incidence of 10 percent, or, in terms of contested Congressional seats, over one in eight. Many comments on the reasons for defeated candidates re-engaging their successful opponents have been given in the past, as well as reasons for the success or failure of such ventures as compared with other contests for the House of Representatives, but they have been mere guesses or theories, not based on practical evidence.

Some plausible hypotheses advanced include the implication that some have no chance of unseating their opponent, but by virtue of prestige within the party or the finances to carry on such a hopeless campaign, they are renominated to lose once more in a one-party area. Others have claimed that these contests result mainly from close districts, with candidates being renominated as a reward for their good showing in the last election and in the hope that a similar campaign could unseat the incumbent. These contests also include the more obvious case of former Congressmen running again to regain their seats from their victorious opponents.

There has been little research in the past of a type helpful in proving or disproving any tentative hypotheses or even guesses in this matter. Inasmuch as some six million Americans recently have been faced with repeat candidates for Congressional seats, it seems important for research to investigate and to determine (a) how perfunctory these contests are in terms of repeat patterns of voting, (b) the chances of winning for those losing an election

and subsequently being renominated against the same opponent, (c) the type of district which has been used for such contests, and (d) the background of candidates who have made the best showing as repeat challengers. This particular study concentrates on investigation of (a) and (b), with the hope that other studies in voting behavior might concentrate on more intensive analyses of the actual districts and candidates involved.

II. RESEARCH ORIENTATION

One would tend to assume that a candidate, defeated for Congress in a regular election, would under ordinary circumstances be subject to similar results in running against the same opponent two years later. If any variation could be expected, it might be most expected in a district where the defeated candidate had improved the usual party showing in that district, had run an extremely close race, or had faced a strong national tide against his party in losing the first race.

Perhaps another type of situation where variation of this assumption might occur is when an ex-Congressman, ousted from his position by a small vote, attempts to regain his seat against the incumbent who defeated him. It would also be useful, from the point of view of comparing with national trends, particularly to notice party affiliations and state patterns in these repeat contests.

Therefore, besides the state, district and actual result of each identical contest, note was taken of the result of the previous election, whether or not the candidate had improved the traditional party showing in the district, numbers of ex-Congressmen involved, and party labels attached to these repeat challengers.

III. LEADING PROPOSITIONS

In a statistical study such as this, it is not surprising that unanticipated conclusions would be seen in the data. However, the propositions and theories which were advanced for testing include the following:

1. That most repeat contests would occur in either one-party districts or in districts where the losing candidate in the previous

election had distinctly improved the showing of his party of two years before.

2. That the most success of losing candidates renominated for the same Congressional seats would come in districts where they either had improved the party percentage in their first effort or where they were ex-Congressmen seeking to regain their seats.

3. That in particular areas of the country organized party strategy might dictate running candidates twice in districts of the other party's strength, in order to get the candidate's name and record before the voter. This was suggested by a comment by a leader of the Michigan Democratic party, who felt that that had been their strategy in the past within strongly Republican districts.

4. That more seats change hands in contests with differing candidates than in similar contests as studied in this paper. This proposition was based on the idea that voters would continue to favor Smith over Jones as long as the two continued competing, but that if Brown ran against Smith, the electorate might then reach a different decision.

IV. EMPIRICAL REQUIREMENTS

The elections used in this study were those of 1954 and 1956, for many reasons. To compare the 1952 election with that of 1950, for example, would involve changed district boundaries due to apportionment changes. The two elections selected included a Presidential and an offyear type, avoiding the national influence which two Presidential elections might yield. Statistics were more readily available than for former elections.

After checking voting records for these repeat contests, tables were set up for both elections. Since 44 similar contests were in evidence at the 1954 election, and 45 in 1956, the comparison of them was more readily done. State, district and party of the incumbent were included, as was his percentage in both elections and the plus or minus change. In special cases, such as an ex-Congressman attempting to regain his seat, a change from one party to the other as a result of the repeat contest, or where the challenger had improved the party percentage in his first attempt, were indicated because of their possible use in reaching conclusions.

TABLE 1

Results (in percentage of incumbent vote)—1954

State	District	Winner's %, 1952	Repeat %, 1956	% Difference	Party Affiliation
California	6	51	49	-2	Dem†
	9	53	55	+2	Rep
	17	55	60	+5	Dem
	18	55	55	0	Rep
Florida	1	51	49	-2	Dem†
Illinois	2	51	62	+11	Dem†
	21	52	55	+3	Dem†
Indiana	8	53	48	-5	Rep††
Iowa	3	56	62	+4	Rep
Kentucky	7	58	60	+2	Dem
Louisiana	1	66	82	+16	Dem
Maryland	5	50	46	-4	Rep†
Massachusetts	9	59	57	-2	Rep
	14	63	62	-1	Rep
Michigan	1	84	88	+4	Dem
	6	53	49	-4	Rep†
	7	60	53	-7	Rep
	8	67	63	-4	Rep
	10	68	61	-7	Rep
	15	67	73	+6	Dem
Minnesota	17	53	48	-5	Rep†
	3	52	54	+2	Dem
Nevada	8	63	72	+9	Dem
	1	51	55	+4	Rep
New Jersey	12	55	53	-2	Rep
New York	1	60	63	+3	Rep†
	11	74	84	+10	Dem
	12	53	51	-2	Rep†
	37	67	62	-5	Rep
Ohio	2	57	58	+1	Rep
	3	51	53	+2	Rep
	6	50	52	+2	Dem
	20	65	68	+3	Dem
Pennsylvania	22	59	58	-1	Rep
	11	50	49	-1	Rep††
	23	68	62	-6	Rep
	25	50	47	-3	Rep†
Rhode Island	2	53	61	+8	Dem
Tennessee	1	66	63	-3	Rep
Utah	2	53	57	+4	Rep
Washington	AL	51	57	+6	Dem
	2	54	52	-2	Rep†
West Virginia	4	53	49	-4	Rep††
Wisconsin	4	64	71	+7	Dem

Results (in percentage of incumbent vote)—1956

State	District	Winner's %, 1952	Repeat %, 1956	% Difference	Party Affiliation
California	25	65	63	-2	Rep
Colorado	3	53	51	-2	Rep*
Illinois	12	54	54	0	Dem†
	23	53	52	-1	Rep*
Indiana	6	53	55	+2	Rep*
	8	52	51	-1	Dem†
	9	52	54	+2	Rep*
Kansas	1	54	54	0	Rep†
	2	55	55	0	Rep*
	6	53	51	-2	Rep*
Maine	3	60	60	0	Rep*
Massachusetts	10	51	54	+3	Rep*
	14	62	62	0	Rep*
Michigan	10	61	67	+6	Rep*
Minnesota	9	51	52	+1	Dem†
Missouri	1	66	67	+1	Dem
	4	52	52	0	Dem†
Montana	2	51	49	-2	Rep†*
Nebraska	4	70	65	-5	Rep*
New Hampshire	2	60	65	+5	Rep*
New Jersey	1	54	58	+4	Rep*
	13	61	50	-11	Dem
	14	62	47	-15	Dem
New York	7	59	50	-9	Dem
	10	77	73	-4	Dem
	11	84	79	-5	Dem
	12	51	58	+7	Rep*
	13	79	70	-9	Dem
	17	50	51	+1	Rep*
Ohio	23	76	76	0	Dem
	17	65	66	+1	Rep*
Oklahoma	20	68	64	-4	Dem
	2	65	60	-5	Dem

* Indicates (in 1956 chart only) the challenger had improved party vote in 1954 over that cast in 1952.

† Indicates in both charts that challenging candidate was former Congressman seeking to regain seat from incumbent who had defeated him two years before.

‡ Indicates in both charts that the seat changed hands as a result of this election.

Figures for 1952 and 1954 from Richard Scammon, *America Votes* (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

Figures for 1956 compiled from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, No. 1, Jan. 4, 1957, pp. 15-18.

Results (in percentage of incumbent vote)—1956

State	District	Winner's %, 1952	Repeat %, 1956	% Difference	Party Affiliation
Oregon	2	53	49	—4	Rep†*
	4	56	48	—8	Rep†*
Pennsylvania	3	55	60	+5	Dem*
	9	63	69	+6	Rep*
	19	51	46	—5	Dem††
	20	56	63	+7	Rep*
	21	61	57	—4	Dem
Tennessee	1	63	72	+9	Rep*
Virginia	9	51	54	+3	Dem†
Washington	6	55	54	—1	Rep*
West Virginia	4	50	46	—4	Dem††
Wisconsin	7	59	62	+3	Rep*

TABLE 2

Observations From Tables

<i>Type of District Involved: (of similar contests)</i>	<i>1954</i>	<i>1956</i>
Strong one-party (60% or more of vote):	16 of 44	19 of 45
Critical (Less than 55% of vote)	24 of 44	22 of 45
Repeat Democratic Candidates	27	26
Repeat Republican Candidates	17	19
Ex-Congressmen as Challengers	8	8
Challenger who improved party showing two years before	Not available	25
<i>Results in Identical Contests and in Entire House</i>	<i>1954</i>	<i>1956</i>
Seats changing hands in identical contests	9(20.5%)	6(13.3%)
Seats changing hands in all contested House races	26(7.4%)	23(6.5%)
Number of challengers improving showing, identical contests	21(48%)	21(47%)
Ex-Congressman regaining seat in identical contests	3	2
Of 25 challengers in 1956 who had im- proved 1952 party showing in 1954, number improving showing again in 1956	—	8(32%)
Average victory margin, repeat elections	18.1% (59-41)	16.2% (58-42)
Average victory margin, all contested House elections	16.4% (58-42)	16.2% (58-42)

V. RESULTS OF HYPOTHESES TESTED AND CONCLUSIONS REACHED

1. Districts involved in repeat contests for Congress include a majority of crucial districts where no party ordinarily wins by over 55% of the vote. However, over one-third of such races are fought in districts where one party wins over 60% of the vote normally. In the 1954 and 1956 elections, a vast majority of identical contests find either ex-Congressmen battling to regain their seats from the incumbents or a candidate who had made an improved showing the previous election over the normal party percentage making another try on the grounds of that increase in percentage.
2. Of the total number of seats changing hands in the House during these elections, proportionally more did so in races where the same candidates were competing as in the past election. In both years, this percentage was twice as much or more, which, though not highly significant statistically, does tend to negate the idea that voters, when faced with identical candidates in successive House elections, automatically check the same name.
3. Most of those who had improved in the election before, failed to improve, in fact, regressed, in voting percentage on their second attempt at Congressional seats. It was those who had failed to increase their party's showing in their district but who were again renominated against the same opponent who made the best recovery in terms of percentage on their second attempt. Thus the second as well as the fourth hypothesis seem not borne out.
4. There seemed otherwise to be little difference between identical contests and regular House elections with new opponents as to margin of victory, trends toward political parties, or sectional switches. Little evidence was seen of organized attempts by political parties in both elections to use repeat contests as strategy to overcome one-party districts of the opposition.
5. Though this study may tend to cast doubt on some tentative

hypotheses and common opinions among voters and politicians, much work should be done on the personality type of successful vs. unsuccessful repeat challengers and on districts where this phenomenon is seen to occur. By this means, more positive conclusions may some day be reached in an analysis of Congressional contests with identical candidates.

Book Reviews

Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, by James MacGregor Burns. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956. Pp. 557. \$5.75.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph, by Frank Freidel. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1956. Pp. 433. \$6.00.

The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957. Pp. 557. \$6.00.

Not long ago Mr. Herman Kahn, the guardian of the vast repository of Roosevelt materials at Hyde Park, remarked that the past year had been "a great one for Roosevelt scholarship"; and he was right. The three works here noticed are ample evidence if there were no others. But there have been, besides, valuable monographs and articles in the recent past; and the signs are that the future will be equally enriched.

It should be noted how the nature of the contributions is changing. In the past there have been, as was natural, many books of record, or reminiscence, or of justification. Mrs. Roosevelt herself, Frances Perkins and Judge Samuel I. Rosenman have written one sort. Raymond Moley, James A. Farley, Edward Flynn and Robert E. Sherwood have written others. And such associates, loyal or disloyal, as Jesse Jones, Marriner Eccles, Cordell Hull, James F. Byrnes and Henry L. Stimson—to name only a few—have recorded their view of the events they participated in. Others are still to come, and they may not be the least interesting—those of A. A. Berle, Henry A. Wallace and Felix Frankfurter, for instance.

All of this literature is direct comment. It is not derived. It originated in the observations of contemporaries. But Messrs. Freidel, Burns and Schlesinger belong to a new generation. They never knew the President; and they were not of an age to appraise the events of his presidency as they occurred. All of them are, in spite of this, inclined to feel themselves still within the aura of his influence and so not quite certain of their own dispassionateness. They seem to feel that they may be accused of being partial.

Nevertheless all three are general and historical accounts. But

Schlesinger's is an "age" book—that is to say it is as much about the times as it is about its principal figure. The others are biographies with the setting incidental, although this seems an understatement for either. A political figure has his interest mostly from his effect on events or their effect on him; it is impossible to describe him without also describing the area-time complex in which he participated. Then, too, Burns's is a "political biography"; and so by definition it is concerned more with the Roosevelt method than with the man himself.

It is a notable fact that Roosevelt does emerge from all their accounts somewhat larger than life. The more realistic the appraisal, the more searching the scholarship, the more heroic the figure becomes. It is not, it is true, quite the one some of the earlier apologists would have had posterity accept; it is more earthy, shows more weaknesses, and is less monolithic. We begin to see a man who struggled to develop and find his way in place of one who always knew and never experienced the sweats and toils of deciding and acting.

The Roosevelt of some early accounts intended either to be favorable or unfavorable has disappeared. It no longer seems to anyone, apparently, that he was fortunate to have inherited wealth, to have had a Groton-Harvard education and generally not to have had a serious struggle in his climb to fame. In this sort of history there had to be a transformation scene when the play-boy became the serious man. This was furnished by the polio attack in 1921, after which there was a new depth and determination. The convalescent man had an altogether new character.

It seems to be agreed now that this is too easy; as more becomes known about his childhood, his youth, and his early political experiences it is seen that he had a very trying time at both Groton and Harvard, was no considerable success at the law, and took up politics eagerly from the first opportunity with the idea of making it a career. To a political career for a Roosevelt there is only one logical end; and it came into view very early and was never abandoned. The polio attack was a misfortune to be overcome, but only a somewhat worse one than others.

The quality in Roosevelt that amazes everyone who studies him carefully is his ability to determine in critical junctures exactly what he must do to progress in his political enterprise. He made only a few mistakes of this kind and from these he recovered with admirable flexibility and skill. Consider, for instance, the use made of Tammany. That organization sometimes seems to have been an invented foil, so appropriately are its entrances and exits managed. But similar use was made of other foils; the private utilities, the money-changers, the economic royalists, and finally, Hitler, all helped him on his way.

Thoughtful historians who write about Roosevelt all come sooner or later to an inescapable moral problem. It is this: is a political man justified in saying and doing what he knows to be wrong in order to get ahead? This question can have many variations and can seem to be more or less demanding as the circumstances vary. But it always comes up; and it always troubles the biographer.

It is interesting to see how it is met. One feels more strongly about the issue in a certain content; another in a different content. Mr. Friedel is hurt by his discovery of equivocation on the League issue in the spring of 1932, partly, it seems, because it involved abasement before the xenophobia of Hearst. In that same spring he seems also to deplore the "noble pose" anent Tammany, when Roosevelt said that he "would not deny the right to be heard even to the meanest criminal in the state." This pose, Freidel concludes, masked from Roosevelt himself, but not from many other people, an "almost hysterical fear" that an offended Tammany might be able to prevent his nomination for the Presidency.

Mr. Burns, in his account, moves through that spring without showing any such reaction. The Tammany problem was merely one that had to be handled. On the whole it was done with skill, its worst phase postponed until after the nomination had been gained. It is only later on, when problems of statesmanship are involved that Mr. Burns seems on the edge of judgment—for instance the truckling to Catholic insistence that allowed the Spanish loyalists to be defeated without any expression of American sympathy. But even this cool political biographer comes to the conclusion that the Roosevelt difficulty was a moral one. "He felt so intensely the need to do right," Mr. Burns says, "that he had to *think* he did right." (p. 475)

But what is not made enough of, it seems to me, in any consideration of this sort, is the recurrent dilemma of the political man—that sometimes he cannot do what is importantly right without accepting or doing or saying what is less importantly wrong. He has daily and monthly and yearly to choose. He has to do more than that. He has to adopt this as a method and a means. He has to make up his mind that he will be forced to do what he would not otherwise have done in order to do what he believes to be essential.

The end here can be of two sorts: his own preferment or the public good. It is, as anyone with ordinary human sympathies will realize, very easy to confuse these. There were undoubtedly times—and the Spring of 1932 was one of them—when candidate Roosevelt felt that it was more important that he should be nominated than that his attitudes on the League, on Tammany, on prohibition, and on several other issues, should be stated as he would otherwise have stated them.

He told Mr. Samuel I. Rosenman how he felt about that: "You know, the first thing a President has to do in order to put through good legislation? He has to get elected! If I were now back on the porch at Hyde Park as a private citizen, there is very little I could do about any of the things that I have worked on. So don't throw votes away by rushing the gun—unless there is some good sound reason. You have to get the votes first—then you can do the good work."

But it is necessary to go even further. There is the question whether he fooled himself. Does a man like President Roosevelt have a mechanism which functions to make the expedient seem right? Mr. Burns thinks so; neither Mr. Freidel nor Mr. Schlesinger is through with the Roosevelt problem yet; neither has progressed beyond his first election to the Presidency. But I think Mr. Freidel is going to answer one way and Mr. Schlesinger the other. Perhaps this is a matter of sophistication or, if you like, cynicism. Mr. Schlesinger feels more strongly that Roosevelt's objectives were worth a high price, even a moral price. Mr. Freidel has a well-controlled but actual puritan strain. In his own mind he judges the individual conduct, even of statesmen, to have individual criteria. It is not just a matter of judging the result; it is a matter of good or bad behavior by the tests we all consent to be judged by.

How does this affect the historians? Let me quote from Schlesinger as he sums up the Tammany problem of early 1932. He first cites Mr. Walter Lippmann's contemporary judgment that the "squalid mess" was due to "nothing but Governor Roosevelt's own weakness and timidity." This had been followed by a harsh and cruel pronouncement that his mind was not very clear, his purposes not simple and his methods not direct. Of this and of the situation Mr. Schlesinger says: "There were issues on which Roosevelt as governor was clear, simple, and direct; and they were conceivably more significant than the New York City scandals. But they received less notice at the time." (p. 395)

Mr. Schlesinger says in this, if I understand him, that Roosevelt saw the future more clearly than Lippmann, and that his sacrifice of "principles" for the future public good was, as it turned out, justified.

It seems to me that this is a good part of the historian's task, at least of those who deal with politicians. The evaluation is not easy. It must be judged whether what was gained was worth what was given up. If the nation is better off because Roosevelt was President, then it is better off because he equivocated and trimmed when it was necessary to his success. Unfortunately it is not even so comparatively

simple as this. To arrive at such a judgment it has to be guessed what the alternatives might have been—in the present case, if Ritchie, Byrd, Baker or Smith had been nominated in 1932. Also, to complicate the matter further, it has to be asked whether the aspirant did not compromise or trade away more than was necessary to the result.

In the campaign of 1932, there was an excellent illustration of this. It could be contended, with a show of evidence, that very little said in that campaign gave the voters a real reason for supporting the Roosevelt plea. He said what would attract votes, not what he believed or even what he felt would have to be done. Thus he wound up without commitments. The most conspicuous exception to this was the promise of economy made in the Pittsburgh speech, and this he would always regret because it was a policy he could not carry out. He accepted it because certain conservatives he was anxious not to offend urged it on him. This taught him a lesson. After that, he practically never allowed himself to be so caught. In every subsequent campaign he moved toward what he called "the center." People on either side were free to believe that he agreed with them. And actually they did so believe, although the method worked less well as time went on. His support at either end of the scale—right or left—became less and less in his later campaigns.

The three historians whose books we now have are all realistic enough about these matters. They are political sophisticates, inclined to grant the interest there can be in a successful method, even though it may be a deplorable one. Mr. Burns is perhaps to be put down as a conservative, and it is not evident that he either admired or liked his subject. Mr. Schlesinger does like him. He accepts him not as perfect but as having only those weaknesses necessarily to be found in any human character. Mr. Freidel as he makes his careful way through his volumes stifles any emotion he may have. But occasionally a kind of proprietary attitude shows through. He is, after all, making a considerable investment in his subject. It cannot be a worthless one.

Every student of Roosevelt or his times will need to have all three of these books.

REXFORD GUY TUGWELL

University of Chicago

The Ninth Wave, by Eugene Burdick. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956. Pp. 332. \$3.95.

The New Men, by C. P. Snow. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954. Pp. 311. \$3.50.

The Last Hurrah, by Edwin O'Connor. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955. Pp. 427. \$4.00.

A novel can be political in two ways. The author may begin with a particular political position or theory which he seeks to animate, in which case the characters tend to become at best secondary, at worst artificial. On the other hand, politics can dominate the characters—their environment, the decisions they face—without completely dominating the novel, if the author keeps his primary interest in his characters and his story.

The epitome of the first type is the "proletarian" novel. During the thirties, the Marxist's demand that his fiction be politically significant was echoed by many who did not share all his other views. For better or worse, the arguments of this period lost much of their edge under the weight of World War II, with its crushing climax of nuclear fission in a divided world. The political novel was a casualty of this change. Political events seemed bigger than we were, and the reaction in fiction was to insist that *We*, meaning whatever our little circle was (and often it was just *Me*), were all that mattered.

Indications are that the political novel, especially of the second type mentioned here, is on its way back in this country. Writers are concluding, says Granville Hicks, that if there is no particular virtue in writing about politics, there is also no particular virtue in *not* writing about politics. It is fitting, therefore, that at least one political scientist has stepped forward to meet them halfway. In his first novel, *The Ninth Wave*, Eugene Burdick proved that he could give the book clubbers their dose of political theory without any reduction in the quota of sex and violence, however irrelevant, to which it is assumed they have become accustomed. He has linked some well-written descriptions of California life by means of a Lasswellian theme, seasoned generously, and produced a book that is highly readable, but not quite believable.

His protagonist, Mike Freesmith, according to the author, was first conceived in a study of irrationality in politics. He never actually rises above his origins to become a real character. Mike discovers early his guiding axiom: "Everybody is scared." With this knowledge, he is able to probe out the particular fear of every group and individual he encounters, and thus to use them. Apparently, this knowledge also

frees Mike himself from both fear and error. He has Faustian power, diabolic and irresistible.

With the governorship in the bag for his candidate, an alcoholic lawyer-orator who has written a work on Hobbes, and the world beyond California waiting to be exploited, Mike's career is cut short when his friend, Hank, drowns him. Hank is handicapped by a moral sense and disapproves of practically everything Mike has ever done; nevertheless, they have been constant companions. ("We got respect for one another.") Mike could have saved himself, but he doesn't. It is not clear whether this is because he thinks Hank is right, or whether, in one fatally irrational moment, he lets the fear of harming a friend get the better of the fear of death itself. The reader is likely to conclude that he found the prospect of limitless success through repeated application of his axiom too boring to be worth the fight.

The political manipulator is always caught up in the forces he is trying to control; the manipulated, whether the pattern set for them is termed rational or irrational, are never sufficiently predictable to oblige Machiavellians and more-than-Utopians. This is why the Lasswell Man, who must be either manipulator or manipulated, is a descriptive fiction like Economic Man, useful only within limits. Burdick's attempt to expand this fiction to life-size results in an interesting grotesque which has no doubt stimulated some political thinking, but life is still missing.

In England, fictional politics has appeared for some time to be more external than domestic. There are Orwell's imaginative treatments of communism, and there are also a number of novels about colonial problems and the shrinking Empire. Graham Greene's *The Quiet American*, with its criticism of the American approach to foreign problems, fits closely with the latter group.

About domestic institutions there has been some troubled introspection, but little of the reappraisal with an eye to alternatives that makes a political literature. This is clearly reflected in the writings of C. P. Snow, a British physicist turned novelist, who combines a traditionalist temperament with the objectivity of the trained scientist. In his Lewis Eliot series, he depicts what has been termed Man in Committee: the lives of those who both make and are bound by decisions of academic, scientific, and civil service committees, as well as the informal committees of class and profession. The type of committee makes little difference: "men do not alter because the issues they decide are bigger scale."

In this world of committee, function follows form, and the public consequences of individual acts are fixed by patterns the individuals cannot change; at most, they can choose one pattern rather than

another. The author's interest is in private feelings and motives. Periodically, somebody chucks the pattern in an inconclusive outburst or action which does not alter the course of events, but only his relation to them. Bitterness and frustration are vented, relations are strained or broken, defiance and guilt contend; then everyone resumes places and the pattern sets in again, with undertones more complex than before. One thinks of Suez.

Snow's narrator, Lewis Eliot, presides over these scenes with a proper and sympathetic detachment. In fact, in the most recent novel, *Homecomings*, he finds that the detachment he has cultivated as a civil servant has so taken hold of him that he can no longer be spontaneous in a personal relationship.

The preceding novel, *The New Men*, concerns scientists working on the first British atomic project. Most of them oppose the use of the bomb when it is developed in America. After Hiroshima, Eliot dissuades one of them, his brother, from denouncing it in a letter that will damage his career. Having sacrificed his conscience, the brother concentrates on his career to the point that Eliot accuses him of looking on human existence as a problem in logistics. He finally refuses the top administrative job toward which he has been working, choosing to go back to research although his talents will give him less success there, because he can thus avoid being involved in the political results of his science.

The new men, of course, are the nuclear physicists, who go on with their work even when they mistrust its effects. As one of them says, "We've all thought that events may be too big for us. But we've got to act as though they're not." In a secondary way, the new men are also the lower middle-class risers like the Eliots, and many of the Barford men. Implicit, too, is the idea that the new men are the Americans, whose assumption of power Eliot bears stoically with the rest of life's misfortunes.

Nothing could be further from the political constructions of C. P. Snow that the political hyperbole of Edwin O'Connor's *The Last Hurrah*, with its vitality, humor, and parade of characters. Some of these are cohorts or enemies of the hero, Frank Skeffington. Others, like that fine example of an objective analyst who wrote the City Hall column for ten years and was so objective he didn't know where City Hall was, appear in his wonderful flow of stories.

Boss Skeffington has greater stature than, say, James Curley of Boston. This is because he is aware, to the point of irony, of his role, and of the era of which it is a part. He knows they are both passing, and he does not give in. When his final defeat as mayor comes, because federal patronage has replaced ward patronage and the younger voters

are not bound by the older loyalties, he announces that he will run for governor and then dies, to the sorrow of many and the relief of some. Events have not been bigger than Skeffington. When it is suggested that he would do things over differently if he could, his last words are, "The hell I would!"

The book has been criticized for its sentimental portrayal of the paternalistic city boss. The *New Yorker* lost its sense of humor so far as to call it "one of those rare things, a truly subversive book." No doubt it was not all such fun, and Mr. O'Connor might have pointed out that not everybody who got hurt deserved to. Still, he is recording the passing of an era, and it is customary to speak with affection and respect of the dead.

Political scientists should welcome a return of the political novel, not only as indirect advertising, but because while we argue over the maps it is nice to see some free-hand sketches of where we have been, and—occasionally—where we may be going.

JAMES F. DAVIDSON

University of Tennessee

American State Politics: An Introduction, by V. O. Key, Jr. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956. Pp. 289. \$4.50.

Huey Long's Louisiana: State Politics, 1920-1952, by Allan P. Sindler. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. 316. \$5.50.

Students of American politics often devote too much time to the national scene and neglect the study of politics within the states. The books reviewed here are helpful reminders of the extent of this neglect and useful in their emphasis on the relevance of effective and responsible party activity to the popular control of our state governments. Key's book is an unusually stimulating and thought-provoking analysis of the problems and prospects of two-party systems within those states having the rudiments of such systems—the South is largely excluded from his study. Sindler's work is limited to a single one-party state—the politics of Louisiana during the period 1920-1952. The first is "must" reading for every student of state government and politics because it shatters many illusions and provides some new and provocative interpretations; the second will be particularly valuable to the student of political parties who wants more evidence that the ticket system in Louisiana, together with bifactionalism as practiced there, more closely approaches the reality of a party system than do the factions in any other Southern state. Key himself had made this observation

in his earlier study of *Southern Politics* and Sindler's book has importance for its substantiation of this point. (p. 283)

State Politics exudes the author's concern over the absence of really effective popular control of state governments. "Within the states, conditions have come to exist that make most difficult the organization of popular leadership. Instead of political sensitivity we often have political stalemate. Instead of ready and easy ways for the expression of popular will we have confusion and obstruction. Instead of the alertness and sensitivity described by the political orators, the actual situation discourages the maintenance of a party leadership and a party competition that might provide dynamic forces necessary for the fulfillment of the mission of the states." (p. 4) We have not adequately explored this problem even though we have been diagnosing the ills of state governments and prescribing remedies for a long time. We have grouped and regrouped administrative agencies and redefined their lines of authority; we have tinkered with civil service recruitment; we have surveyed financial systems to plug leaks; we have had an abundance of little Hoover commissions. We have, however, given very little attention to the responsiveness to popular will of that corps of elective officials who actually decide upon policy in the legislature or as the leaders of the executive branch.

Key uses a large number of figures and tables which graphically record an extensive research into the voting habits of people in many states over a long period to show that the present state party systems do not provide for genuine popular government. He believes that party systems can and should accomplish this purpose. There are obstructions of many kinds. Issues, cleavages and loyalties of national politics are shown to push themselves powerfully into the politics of the states. No matter how commendable the state record of a party may be, it is often thrown out of office for the shortcomings of its national allies. Evidence shows that scheduling gubernatorial elections in years when no presidential elections are held does very little to make state politics independent of national influence; this may only weaken the minority party. Most states have developed a wondrous damper on party government in their systems of separated powers; allegiance to such systems provides an obstruction to popular decision. The direct primary came as an escape from one-partyism; it has led to a substitution of intraparty politics for interparty politics even in many of the states believing they have a two-party system. The few who really elect in such primaries are not only not a miniature of the general public in the state; they are not even a miniature of the party making the selection. Key uses some interesting figures and arguments to establish this point and to indicate the consequences to

popular rule of unrepresentative primary turnouts. The long ballot is also a villain because a "multiplicity of independent elective offices obstructs party government and thereby obstructs popular government." (pp. 212-213)

Perhaps enough has been said to give a little of the flavor of *State Politics*. Key spends little time discussing solutions. His main purpose is the "more modest one of opening up the discussion of some of the major problems, of suggesting modes of investigation, and stimulating further inquiry." (p. v.) This purpose he has admirably and brilliantly fulfilled; it is hoped that others will undertake similar explorations. Key does point out in his final chapter that the problem of popular government is essentially the problem of party government. Mechanisms of state government that place severe limitations upon parties should be reconsidered and perhaps removed. Parties must work toward less fractionalizing and more candidate-seeking if their organization and capacity to govern are to be improved. Legislatures might be revitalized in order to serve as a better training ground for political leadership and party activity. To achieve stronger party government we must certainly change "those good people who have discouraged partisanship as civic wickedness and have caused the diversion of vast quantities of social energy from party channels to nonparty activity or simply to inaction." (p. 131)

Any person who adds a book to the quantity of literature on Huey Long needs to explain his reason for doing so. Sindler defends his work by suggesting that most recent writers have adopted a "great man" view in writing on Louisiana and the career of the Kingfish. The author of the book reviewed here is primarily interested in an analysis of the form and content of Louisiana's bifactional politics. Huey Long is important only as an integral part of that analysis. Through a complete and attractive presentation of voting statistics in 50 tables and figures covering primary and regular elections between 1920 and 1952, and by an obviously thorough (though sometimes too detailed and confusing) analysis of the issues and programs of political leaders, Sindler makes a strong case for what he himself may have stated as the most important contribution of his book: "Bifactionalism and the ticket system have served, with considerable effectiveness, as Louisiana's substitutes for a two-party system. Unlike several sister Southern states, Louisiana's politics has not been characterized by a chaotic multifactionalism, by a bewildering succession of transitory state factions without continuity in program, leadership, or voter loyalty. Localism and a 'friends and neighbors' influence have been reduced to minimal proportions within a polarized politics of pro- and anti-Longism. The voter is offered a meaningful choice between

factions embracing alternative leaders and programs, while the victorious faction normally is assured of a working control of the administrative and legislative branches to effectuate its pledges made to the voters. Huey Long thus gave Louisiana a structured and organized politics, a politics that made sense." (p. 282) In establishing this case the author relates many humorous and colorful stories about the Kingfish, the persons around him and the enemies who sought to overcome him. The book has value for the thesis it presents, but it is carried along in large part by the anecdotes and shenanigans of Huey Long and his men.

RALPH S. FJELSTAD

C. S. College

Problems of Power in American Democracy, edited by Arthur Kornhauser. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1957. Pp. 239. \$5.00.

This volume consists of five lectures delivered at Wayne State University in 1955. Despite the seeming unity of concern suggested by the title, the lectures comprise a set of more or less discrete essays on various aspects (not always "problems") of what is loosely termed "power."

Of the group, Robert Lynd's paper, "Power in American Society as Resource and Problem," is easily the most searching and provocative. Lynd is primarily concerned here to argue four things: first, that power exists because it performs the necessary function of establishing and maintaining a particular version of order (or of disorder) and not because of an imputed unruliness or anti-social quality in human nature; second, that power as a major social resource is neither inherently "bad" nor "good" but is capable of use or abuse in the service of values and institutions of a wide variety of social structures; third, and more importantly, that while power must always be viewed in terms of continuing lines of related actions, it is basically monistic rather than pluralistic, with its generating source to be found in the social structure of a society rather than in individuals or in institutions; and finally, that a democratic social structure is incompatible with systems of power operated by private power agencies for private and socially irresponsible purposes. Indeed, Lynd argues, "the fact that purportedly democratic political institutions operate upon a factually undemocratic class base appropriate to capitalism" constitutes *the* problem of power and of democracy in our time.

With impressive skill Lynd marshals the evidences for his arguments, and it is clear that any alternative power analysis must henceforth

come squarely to terms with the position he sketches here. But even if we set aside Lynd's unfortunate addiction to quaint but imprecise language—e. g., the employment of "democratic means" for "democratic ends," or "collective ends," or "collective democratic ends"; or the quoted stipulation that democracy needs "fire in its belly"—there remain a number of serious questions. I have space for but one: Can any single-factor analysis adequately account for the multiple and diverse power relationships that everywhere exist in a particular (if complex) social structure, or for common patterns of power relationships that are often to be found among different social structures?

Unlike Lynd, Harold Lasswell's paper, "Political Power and Democratic Values," breaks no new ground but restates once again his conviction that political salvation, not least in times of crisis, is to be achieved only through the rule of "right" personalities—i.e., "men of competence and good will"—who will employ the media of mass communication on an unprecedented scale to produce "a common conception of the problem-solving goals and methods of our nation." Unfortunately, Lasswell has yet to demonstrate that such an aristocracy and what he euphemistically calls "civic education," are truly compatible with democratic values.

A. H. Maslow begins his paper, "Power Relationships and Patterns of Personal Development," by decrying an adjustment psychology as quite undesirable and even dangerous, and by insisting that "the concept 'democratic personality' is simply not a scientific concept; there is no agreement whatsoever on its meaning." He then devotes the following thirty-five pages of his lecture to the definition and elaboration of this term, concluding with the quite remarkable observation that the democratic personality—who is now said to be emotionally mature, loving and strong, responsible and flexible—"will behave in a democratic fashion if he find himself in a society where democratic political forms prevail. How such a person would behave in non-democratic societies, we simply don't know."

C. Wright Mills' essay argues his now familiar thesis of "The Power Elite: Military, Economic, and Political." For those who have not read his book, this lecture may serve as a convenient summary.

The final paper, "Power Relationships and the Role of the Social Scientist," is contributed by the editor. This is a somewhat involved effort to show that men and groups differently situated in the social structure develop different conceptions of their self-interests, and consequently encourage or oppose those social science endeavors which seem to help or to threaten them. Now it is a curious fact, as American radicals will sadly attest, that men and groups differently situated often tend to think alike; and while it is true, of course, that some

power groups take social scientists and their work seriously enough to worry about them, and that (conversely) some social scientists are sufficiently attracted by the inducements of such groups to abandon scholarly concerns for more restricted and immediately rewarding "research," it is also true to say that in America the output of social scientists is quite commonly ignored. Such indifference might be viewed as a useful if not essential condition of academic or occupational freedom, but Kornhauser finds it distressing. He hopes, indeed, that social scientists, like physical scientists today, will eventually be called upon to assist in the solution of policy questions; and he urges by way of preparation that we develop "a *democratically* oriented social science" serving the interests of all the people rather than those of leaders and influencers alone. But this, Kornhauser recognizes, is an ethical rather than a scientific problem.

DAVID SPITZ

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The Mexican Government Today, by William P. Tucker. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957. Pp. 484. \$6.50.

Political scientists who respond to the prevailing conceptual turmoil in the social sciences with irritation or indifference are likely to welcome Professor Tucker's treatise on Mexican government with manifest appreciation. They will find the scholarship diligent, the organizational framework familiar, the collection of facts useful, the terminology devoid of the esoteric, and the judgments of value congenial. They will conclude that the book plugs a substantial gap in the study of comparative government.

With impressive industry (reflected in a crowded bibliography of 39 pages), Tucker assembles data scattered among such diverse sources as monographs, periodicals, newspapers, official documents, and dissertations, both Spanish and English. (His exploitation of graduate dissertations, including those now available on microfilm and those completed in Mexican educational institutions, in fact, constitutes a notable feature of his research and may prove suggestive to other scholars). He manages to classify and record, essentially in descriptive fashion, a wealth of fragmentary detail under the conventional chapter titles of books on the government and politics of the United States: "The Constitutional System," "The Congress," "The Presidency," "The Judiciary," "Public Administration," "State Government," "Local Government," "The Federal District and the Territories." Perhaps imitating the thick textbooks of recent vintage on North American Government, this volume also devotes a considerable amount of space

to the historical evolution of Mexican foreign and domestic policies. (There are chapters on communications, electrification, oil, public works, agriculture, labor, social security, health, education, defense policy and "Government's Positive Economic Role.") There is no appendix, however, and the text of the Mexican Constitution is not included.

At the level of opinion, Tucker does not deviate significantly from the dominant value orientation among academic specialists on Latin America. He deplores "political immaturity" (p. 11), "irresponsible congressional opposition" (p. 13), the "disastrous agrarian policy" of Díaz (p. 14) and graft (pp. 21-22, 132-133, 421). He admires Cárdenas as a man whose "integrity was unquestioned" (p. 19), believes that Ruiz Cortines's "rigorous campaign for efficiency, official honesty, and a balanced governmental program give promise of better days for Mexico" (p. 139), and cautiously evaluates Mexico as "a developing democracy" (p. 419).

Political scientists who insist that research in comparative politics should yield results useful in the construction of systematic, scientific theory and who regularly employ the concepts of "power," "decision-making" and "conflict of interests" as basic analytical tools will react with qualified enthusiasm to Tucker's work. They will find that casual references to such concepts as power and charismatic leadership do not perceptibly influence the selection of data or the structure of the book. They will find a reference to the "extensive use . . . of personal interviews" in the Preface (p. viii), but only rarely does the author, in the body of the book, attribute information to this source (p. 140, for example). No sampling or statistical techniques of course were employed, and apparently there was no attempt to compile comparable data by means of the interviews. They will find much of the discussion of the formal aspects of the Congress and the Presidency sterile (pp. 99, 106-107, for example). They will find the analysis of the ruling Party of Mexico (PRI) effectively cast in a "conflict of interests" frame of reference, and they will find that Tucker, despite his legalistic bias, asserts (with his italicized emphasis) that: "*Mexican government* has been, to a considerable degree, *party politics*." (p. 41). But they will gasp to discover that the chapter on "Parties and Politics" is placed in an introductory section labelled—"Background"! (The Church, which Tucker describes along with the Party as one of "the two most important forces in public life," likewise is considered as "Background"). And they will conclude that the author only sporadically addresses himself to the most relevant questions.

MERLE KLING

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Law and Structures of Social Action, by Kenneth S. Carlston. New York: Columbia University Press, 1956. Pp. 288. \$5.50.

Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, by James Willard Hurst. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Pp. 139. \$2.50.

The Law and One Man Among Many, by Arthur E. Sutherland. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Pp. 101. \$2.50.

At first glance these three volumes may strike one as dissimilar except for the parallelism of their titles. Professor Carlston's volume is expository in nature, didactic, at times overlaid with jargon of not one but several academic departments. Professor Hurst take us into little-known areas of our legal history and in the process provides some significant correctives to conventional views of law and society in the century of continental expansion. Professor Sutherland's lectures cope with the concept of freedom in the framework of law, both in a broad philosophic and a specific applicatory sense.

In readability and style the two publications of the University of Wisconsin Press deserve high plaudits. Partly, no doubt, because the manuscripts were originally intended for oral presentation they are notably free of those plagues of academic writing, the interminable sentence, the tortured grammar and the special-purpose vocabulary. This, of course, is no surprise to anyone who has read earlier products of the two authors. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Professor Carlston. Without question, his is a different purpose and it may not be entirely fair to him to make any comparison with the other two books. Yet, in a generic sense, these three volumes are of a kind and may well be subjected to analogous scrutiny.

Not one of these books, I submit, could have been written fifty years ago. Each of them presupposes that reorientation of juristic concepts which Husik subsumed in the title he gave to his translation of Ihering's key work: *Law as a Means to an End*. The "end," for all three authors, is conceived to be freedom; the writer's purpose in each instance might be reduced to this query: how has, how does, how shall law best serve the attainment of that end?

Professor Hurst dwells mostly in the past and more precisely in the American past from about 1776 to about 1908. In this period of our history, he finds freedom tantamount to the release of energy. Before 1870, this meant largely the energy of individuals and law significantly "released" this energy by ever-increasing devices for group action. The era of substantive due process and monopolistic combinations which followed may then be seen as an age when groups rather than individuals exercised this energy-releasing liberty and "we had much

yet to learn about how to fulfill individual freedom in a group-organized society" (p. 107). The nineteenth century had seen law used by Americans to broaden and extend the range of choices open to the individual; the sound instinct of the pioneer, the determined design of the entrepreneur: these were two facets of the same phenomenon—as de Tocqueville had rather uniquely perceived. Hurst contributes far more than a period piece in legal literature; this is indeed an interpretation of the social function of law as well as a highly suggestive interpretation of the society which this law served and in turn helped to fashion. Thus it deserves to be read not only by students of legal history but by all those whose work touches upon the meaning and substance of American institutions.

In *The Law and One Man Among Many* Professor Sutherland of the Harvard Law School views freedom as a commingling of two notions, absence of restraint and a sense of personality. The former is perhaps little more than an aspiration; it is the latter, "individualism" with a connotation of self-sufficiency, which becomes translated into the legal order and hence determines the quality (and quantity) of human freedoms. Two paragraphs illustrate both the approach of the author and the urbane felicity of his manner. Near the end of the first lecture Sutherland observes:

Evidently achieving freedom is no simple matter. It is far from the uncomplicated throwing off of evil rulers which Hamilton treated in the Eighty-fourth *Federalist*. And it appears still more complex if one reflects that much constraint of the individual comes not from the rule of other men but from stubborn inanimate nature. Romantically one thinks of the pioneer woodsman as the freest of men, untrammelled by the crowd. Civilization hampered him little enough, it is true; but the mere absence of human organization around him, the lack of policemen, tax collectors, censors, and censorious neighbors did not give him much liberty to dispose of his time as he saw fit. A chance to loaf and invite the soul requires complex division of labor. In today's world it probably requires co-operative effort by government at one and perhaps several levels. On the pioneer in the wilderness pressed continually the unceasing and constrictive necessities of survival: provision of food for himself and his family; imperative care for dependent domestic animals; endurance of agues and colics without respite. He was free of government, but could do as he pleased only if he liked what he could not escape.

This I stress in order to avoid accusation of falling into what my colleagues Professors Fuller and Hart call the "Fallacy of the Static Pie"—the fallacious theory that there is only so much of anything, like a single pie to be cut, and that whatever government gives to Jones it must take away from Smith. On the contrary, when a town water supply is established in the pioneer settlement, freedom of the spigot replaces slavery to the pail—and everyone in town is better off. But the analogy of the expanding pie does not demonstrate the justice of every law. Sometimes we do hurt Peter to help Paul or a multitude of Pauls; and as Peter sees it, the justice of the arrangement may be perplexing. (pp. 32-33)

It is to this last problem, the "Perception of Justice," that Professor Sutherland invites special attention. When "one man among many" is subjected by the organization of his fellow men to unequal treatment, the moral basis of the distinction made cannot for long be avoided. Constitutional law abounds in instances; Sutherland quotes extensively from Frankfurter's and Black's opinions in *Rochin v. California* and confesses himself "troubled" by the latter Justice's invocation of a vague "sense of injustice." He would add the stipulation (this in a discussion of Edmond Cahn's book of that title) that the sense of injustice must be righteous. The question of the values implicit in that adjective is no less difficult to resolve: Sutherland concludes that "man's thought is rarely simple" and that "the good, the natural, the useful may all seem to compel decision in the same case" (earlier he asserts that "most judges are at least part Benthamite . . .")—but there may be times when the accustomed may be the just—or, I would presume, the less unjust. Thus justice becomes uniquely entrusted to the judicial decision-maker. As "each of us wants to have his own individuality respected by the law," judges individualize what legislators have generally ordained. Professor Sutherland is satisfied that the task is in good (i. e. wise) hands.

Freedom is perhaps not the single major theme of Professor Carlston's book but it occupies a key position in his examination of the place of law in society. Professor Carlston embraces the current emphasis on groups as the active units in society; freedom hence acquires meaning by the participation of the individual in the basic institutions of the society. It is in his relation with others that man finds happiness. Groups in turn find their fulfillment as they work with other groups. The nation-state system is seen as contrary to the natural tendencies of men to work with, rather than to the exclusion of, others.

Professor Carlston has undertaken an ambitious task and some of his insights are full of challenge. His use, for instance, of Earl Latham's *Group Basis of Politics* seems to me to be a significant extension of the arguments of that book. Whether cultural anthropologists in general would accept Carlston's use of their materials I am not certain; the controversies over law among the primitive tribes would not appear to be as fully resolved as this book might suggest.

Most importantly, however, there remains the question of assumptions: does man really find his fulfillment in group action (alone?) or is Sutherland correct in asserting that each of us wants to have his own individuality? Hurst's study would seem to supply this possible synthesis: that there is a point beyond which the group may become a threat to the individual, yet until that point is reached the individual tends to use his freedom preferably and most fruitfully in the association with others.

FRANCIS H. HELLER

University of Kansas

Book Notes

The Approach to Self-Government, by Sir Ivor Jennings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Pp. 204. \$3.00.

This is a brilliant and hard-headed discussion of the problems of developing a constitution for a country about to embark on self-government. The distinguished author has had first-hand experience in this field as constitutional adviser to Ceylon, Pakistan and the Maldiv Islands, and of course he also knows the Indian situation thoroughly. From this predominantly Asian experience he seeks to draw generalizations which will be suggestive for other dependent territories now approaching independent status.

He starts out by deprecating too much concern with the mechanics of government. "The real problem in any country, and not least in a country which is moving toward self-government, is not to draft a Constitution or to make the laws, but to find men and women capable of running the machinery of government." (p. 24) Still, the mechanics must be provided for, and in ten brief chapters, whose graceful style reflects the fact that the material was originally presented as BBC talks, he discusses the main issues in constitution-making—the unit of government, elections, bills of rights, and so on. Since he is thinking of situations where independence was achieved in a peaceful fashion, he is particularly concerned with problems of the transition period. He regrets that nationalist politicians in countries approaching the stage of independence find it more attractive to denounce their governor and all proposed transitional measures, and to demand immediate independence, rather than to attempt to work a difficult transitional constitution. This is a valuable practical handbook of comparative government.

The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950, by Norman A. Graebner. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1956. Pp. 289. \$4.00.

This chronological interpretation of major American foreign policy since 1950 includes much thoughtful analysis but is stridently opinion-

ated and repetitive in presentation. The author is at his best when he is explaining the dilemmas that Republican vote-getters have faced in their choice of campaign issues in this era of the welfare state; the incentives to play upon foreign-policy prejudices are rightly emphasized. Graebner is vehemently committed to the view that the United States must work out some kind of spheres-of-influence deal with the Communist powers. The "peaceful liberation" policy of the Eisenhower administration, no matter how watered down in practice, is the author's *bête noire*, for he feels that it blocks a genuine accommodation with the Soviet bloc (as did the analogous policy toward Japan before World War II).

To Graebner, writing before the Hungarian revolt, reluctance to make concessions on "liberation" derives simply from a belief in American omnipotence which in turn, together with unilateralism, is a frustrating hangover from an old isolationist tradition. Unfortunately the author is not very precise in differentiating these concepts and explaining their interrelationships. This failure prevents him from delineating the subtle but highly significant gradations of opinion across the spectrum he pins together as "the new isolationism." Yet, within these limitations, Graebner does furnish a convenient summary of an important body of thought.

B. W.

Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, by Karl A. Wittfogel. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. Pp. 556. \$7.50.

The "hydraulic thesis" put forward in this study is that land areas served by great river basins may become the setting for distinctive types of political systems, provided that control of the water supply can be secured and that large scale agriculture serves as the foundation of the economy. Professor Wittfogel contends that the hydraulic thesis explains the bureaucratic character of the governing systems in China, Egypt, and Mesopotamia, as distinguished from more feudalistic systems in Western Europe and Japan. He also equates this kind of bureaucratic regime with a quasi-totalitarian despotism based upon terror as the chief instrument of control.

Although the strictly causal explanation of the bureaucratic phenomenon is subject to some doubt, the relationship between despotic power and control of the energy supply is a reasonable and important hypothesis. However, it needs to be supplemented by recognition of the relationship between the kinds of military instrumentalities and

governmental control. In Greece, for instance, heavy armor and horse power constituted the basis of aristocratic leadership. In China, where Wittfogel insists most strongly upon his hydraulic thesis, the use of the reflex bow—capable of piercing heavy armor—led to a severe reduction in the possibilities of oligarchic feudalism, and was more important than hydraulic control in introducing a central regime. Even so, this central control was hardly despotic or total in Wittfogel's sense and considerable local and popular resistance remained possible.

Notwithstanding these strictures, *Oriental Despotism* contains a potentially important thesis. Unfortunately it is poorly developed and dogmatically asserted. The vast quantities of empirical data referred to, the accuracy of which few reviewers will be able to appraise, seem designed more to display the learning of the author than to contribute to a systematic exploration of the thesis.

M. K.

TVA: The First Twenty Years, edited by Roscoe C. Martin. University, Alabama and Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Alabama Press and University of Tennessee Press, 1956. Pp. 282. \$4.50.

This volume is based on a series of lectures given by staff members of the TVA at Florida State University in 1953. It supplies a complete and authoritative review of the widespread activities of that interesting agency. As an official staff report, its weakness is the absence of appraisal of the program or consideration of the wider political setting of the Authority's work. Some effort to supply these inevitable omissions is made in the concluding chapter written by the volume's editor, Roscoe C. Martin. Out of his long familiarity with the agency, he highlights the major issues with which it has dealt and those facing it in the future. Since the work takes no account of happenings since 1953, the TVA's vicissitudes under an unfriendly national administration are not covered.

The Office of Prime Minister, by Byrum E. Carter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. Pp. 362. \$5.00.

This is the first full-length study of the office of Prime Minister in Britain by an American, and the categories which the author uses for description and analysis of the office facilitate comparisons with the American presidency. There is an historical survey, but the

emphasis is on the office since 1894. After a chapter on selection of the Prime Minister, Carter examines his relations with the public, his party, formation of a government, the Cabinet, Parliament, and the conduct of foreign affairs and war. The differing routes by which the various prime ministers have reached office are examined. The concluding chapter reviews the factors which have elevated the Prime Minister from his nineteenth century cabinet role as *primus inter pares* to the position of unquestioned dominance in Parliament and party which he now occupies.

The Refugee and the World Community, by John G. Stoessinger. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. Pp. 239. \$4.50.

Refugees have been a perennial problem, but in former ages there were not so many and the possibilities for emigration to new lands were great. In the nineteenth century, an expanding United States became a new home for refugees from oppression as well as for the discontented or adventurous. With the end of the First World War, the situation of the stateless person—the refugee who could not find a new home—became crucial. The “Nansen passport” of the League of Nations represented the inter-war attempt to cope with this problem. Even greater efforts became necessary with the end of World War II. Stoessinger explores the history of the problem in the twentieth century and analyzes the attempts of the agencies of the League of Nations and United Nations to meet it. In paying attention to the personal and social disintegration of the new hordes of displaced persons, he performs a valuable human as well as an insightful and scholarly service.

The Creative Role of the Supreme Court of the United States, by M. Ramaswamy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956. Pp. 138. \$3.00.

This book consists of three lectures given at Stanford University by a distinguished Indian jurist, senior advocate of the Supreme Court of India, and author of the code of fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution. Looking at the U.S. Supreme Court through sympathetic foreign eyes, he discusses its role in interpreting the Constitution, umpiring the federal system, and enforcing civil liberties. An epilogue presents some interesting comparisons with relevant Indian developments.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

- American Democracy in Theory and Practice* (Essentials Edition), by Robert K. Carr, Marver H. Bernstein, Donald H. Morrison, and Joseph E. McLean. New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957. Pp. 737. \$6.50.
- International Government*, by Clyde Eagleton. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1957 (third edition). Pp. 665. \$6.50.
- The American Way of Government*, by Alfred de Grazia. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957. Pp. 971. \$6.95.
- American Government*, by James L. McCamy. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. Pp. 866. \$6.50.
- Abraham Lincoln: Selected Speeches, Messages, and Letters*, edited by T. Harry Williams. New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957. Pp. 290. \$.75.
- Franklin D. Roosevelt: Selected Speeches, Messages, Press Conferences, and Letters*, edited by Basil Rauch. New York: Rinehart and Co., 1957. Pp. 391. \$1.25.
- "Woodrow Wilson Centennial Issue," *Florida State University Studies*, No. 23. Tallahassee: The Florida State University, 1956. Pp. 102.
- Government in America*, by Stephen K. Bailey, Howard D. Samuel, and Sidney Baldwin. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1957. Pp. 587. \$6.50.

PROGRAM OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING MIDWEST CONFERENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

Held at the Hotel Abraham Lincoln, Springfield, Illinois, May 2-4, 1957. Hosts for the meeting were the Illinois Legislative Council and the University of Illinois.

THURSDAY EVENING, MAY 2

General Session:

- Presiding:** Wilfred E. Binkley, Ohio Northern University, President,
Midwest Conference of Political Scientists
- Greetings:** Honorable William G. Stratton, Governor of Illinois
- Welcome:** Clarence A. Berdahl, University of Illinois
- Address:** Quincy Wright, Visiting Research Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "The Place of International Law in the Contemporary Study and Practice of International Relations"

FRIDAY MORNING, MAY 3

Round Tables:

1. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT, I

- Chairman:** Joseph Schlesinger, Michigan State University
- Myron Weiner, University of Chicago:** "The Politics of Manipulation: Interest Groups in India"
- Discussants:** Austin Ranney, University of Illinois; Robert Holt, University of Minnesota; James B. Christoph, Ohio State University; Joseph Dunner, Grinnell College

2. THE 1956 ELECTIONS

- Chairman:** Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan
- Warren Miller, University of Michigan:** "The 1956 Elections"
- Discussants:** Neil Staebler, Democratic State Chairman of Michigan; Morton Hollingsworth, Republican National Committeeman, Illinois; Heinz Eulau, Antioch College; Ralph Goldman, Michigan State University

3. POLITICAL THEORY, I

- Chairman:** Minoo Adenwalla, Kenyon College
- William McGovern, Northwestern University:** "The Political Theorist and the Problem of Political Morale"
- Discussants:** Milton Greenberg, Western Michigan University; David Kettler, Ohio State University; Russell Kirk, Mecosta, Michigan; Philip Haring, Knox College

4. MILITARY POLICY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Chairman: Alfred J. Hotz, Western Reserve University
Captain Joseph C. Wylie, U.S.N., Head of the Navy Plans Branch,
Strategic Plans Division, Chief of Naval Operations: "Military
Power in International Relations"

Discussants: Warrick Elrod, Department of State; Charles Foster,
Indiana University; Robert Osgood, University of Chicago; Joseph
E. Black, Miami University; Royden Dangerfield, University of
Illinois

5. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT

Chairman: Edward Banfield, University of Chicago
Gary Brazier, Western Reserve University: "Suburbia—The Parties'
New Battleground"

Discussants: Deil S. Wright, Wayne State University; O. Charles
Press, Michigan State University; Herbert Gans, University of
Pennsylvania

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 3

Luncheon:

Presiding: Wilfred E. Binkley
Address: E. E. Schattschneider, President, American Political Science
Association: "The New Politics"

FRIDAY EVENING, MAY 3

Round Tables:

1. COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT, II

Chairman: Ralph Goldman, Michigan State University
Joseph A. Schlesinger, Jr., Michigan State University: "The Radical
Party and the Creation of the Republican Front"

Discussants: Anthony T. Bouscaren, Marquette University; Roy
Pierce, University of Michigan

2. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Chairman: Harvey Mansfield, Ohio State University
Murray Edelman, University of Illinois: "Predictability in the Exer-
cise of Administrative Discretion"

Discussants: Clara Penniman, University of Wisconsin; Robert Matte-
son, American Society for Public Administration

3. POLITICAL THEORY, II

Chairman: David Kettler, Ohio State University
Mulford Sibley, University of Minnesota and Reverend Stanley Parry,
Notre Dame University: "The Theory of Constitutional Govern-
ment and its Relation to the Loyalty and Liberties of Citizens"

Discussants: Philip Haring, Knox College; Richard Longaker, Kenyon
College; Francis Wilson, University of Illinois

4. COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN ASIA

Chairman: T. A. Bisson, Western College for Women
John H. Kautsky, Washington University: "Soviet Policy and Communist Strategy in India"
Discussants: Myron Weiner, University of Chicago; Willard H. Elsbree, Ohio University

5. SCIENTIFIC THEORY AS A GOAL OF GRADUATE TRAINING

Chairman: Thomas H. Eliot, Washington University
Paper: William N. Chambers, Washington University
Discussants: George Blanksten, Northwestern University; Philip Monypenny, University of Illinois; William Riker, Lawrence College

SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 4

Breakfast: Sponsored by Springfield ASPA Chapter

Address: John Corcoran, Public Administration Service; "Shibboleths Re-examined: The Constitution of Alaska"

General Session:

Chairman: Marshall Knappen, University of Michigan
"Methods of Teaching About Communism"

Participants: Carroll Hawkins, Michigan State University; Anthony T. Bouscaren, Marquette University; Gerhart Niemeyer, Notre Dame University; Mulford Q. Sibley, University of Minnesota

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
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The Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference will be held April 24-26, 1958, at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The Chairman of the Program Committee will be Professor Clark F. Norton of DePauw University. Communications regarding the 1958 program should be addressed to him at the Department of Political Science, DePauw University, Greencastle, Indiana.



The **MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE** is the official publication of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists. It is published quarterly, in February, May, August, and November, by *Wayne State University Press*, Detroit. It is a general review open to all members of the profession and to all areas of the discipline of political science.

EDITOR: *David Fellman*, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin. All manuscripts and communications regarding articles should be sent to him at 203 South Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wisconsin.

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The *subscription rate* for members of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists is \$7.50, which includes the fee for annual membership in the Conference. For non-members the annual subscription rate in the United States is \$6.00, in Canada, \$6.15, elsewhere \$6.35. Non-members should order directly from Wayne State University Press, 4841 Cass Avenue, Detroit 2, Michigan. Students are eligible to subscribe to the *Journal* at the special student rate of \$4.00 a year. Student subscriptions must be countersigned by a faculty member of the Conference and forwarded, together with a check, to Charles W. Shull, Managing Editor.

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR: *C. Herman Pritchett*, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, Chicago 37, Illinois. Books for review should be sent directly to Mr. Pritchett.

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All communications regarding membership in the Conference, including membership dues, should be addressed to the Secretary, at the Department of Political Science, Drake University, Des Moines 11, Iowa.

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS

by Frederick H. Hartmann, *University of Florida*

This book presents an intensive consideration of theory, carefully balanced with a practical and factual coverage of current international affairs. The material is organized to provide a coherent, concise study of the subject and there is careful analysis of the relations between states, the settlement of disputes arising out of these relations, and the role of international organization in the search for collective security. Case studies are used liberally and a variety of tables, diagrams, and maps complement the text material.

"It is a comprehensive, sound and clear treatment of everything normally taken to be included in the field of international relations."—*a professor who read the manuscript*

1957

637 pages

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AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

by Harold F. Alderfer, *Pennsylvania State University*

"Professor Alderfer has written a modern, comprehensive and well-organized volume describing the entire field of American local government and administration. It covers not only urban and municipal local units but also counties, townships, school districts and special districts. The author has made good use of new data available in the municipal field, particularly material released by the Federal Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. The author also gives emphasis to illustrative material of recent date, including bibliography.

"The book examines the units and form of American local government, its powers, functions, administrative techniques and services. Considerable attention has been devoted to federal-local and state-local relationships, especially as they have developed since World War II. Though primarily intended to be a textbook, the volume stands as a reliable, up-to-date source for general information on American local government."—*The American City Magazine*

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